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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
LEGISLATION
Thomas C. Berg*
In City ofBoerne v. Flores,' the Supreme Court struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 2 insofar as it applied to state and
local laws. RFRA was Congress's response to the Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,3 which held that in most cases, a neutral law
that applies generally to conduct may be applied to religiously motivated
conduct without violating the Free Exercise Clause, no matter how severe the
effect on religious practice or how trivial the government's need to apply the
law. Congress believed that religious practice deserved more protection than
Smith's constitutional rule gave it, and in RFRA, Congress legislated the
following statutory return to the rule that, at least on its face, governed before
Smith: laws that "substantially burden" religious exercise must meet a high
standard of justification (must serve a "compelling governmental interest"),
whether or not they apply to a wide range of nonreligious conduct as well.
4
To support the application of RFRA to restrain state and local laws,
Congress relied on its power to pass "appropriate" legislation to "enforce" the
Fourteenth Amendment, a power granted in Section 5 of the Amendment.5
Congress asserted that it could use its Fourteenth Amendment power to protect
free exercise rights against state and local laws because the Free Exercise
Clause applies to such laws through its incorporation in the Amendment; the
Supreme Court in Boerne agreed with this claim." But the Court held that
RFRA exceeded the Section 5 power because the statute sought to enforce not
the general applicability rule of Smith, but rather the stricter standard embodied
in the compelling interest test. The Court said that the reach of the enforcement
power was determined by the Court's standard for interpreting the (incorpo-
* Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University. I have presented
earlier versions of these thoughts not only at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock
symposium on City of Boerne v. Flores in September 1997, but also in testimony to the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in July 1997, and in a pro bono amicus
curiae brief filed in the Eighth Circuit on behalf of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of
Religion in Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church in October 1997. For helpful
comments, I thank Daniel Conkle and Marci Hamilton especially, and other participants in the
Little Rock symposium as well.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb ("RFRA").
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
5. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the [other] provisions of [the Amendment].").
6. See 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
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rated) Free Exercise Clause, not by Congress's standard of interpretation.7
Congress could develop remedies to enforce the Court's general standard (even
if that meant going beyond what the Court would order in particular cases), but
it could not proceed on the basis of a stricter general standard.
For those (like me) who believe that the rule of Smith gives too little
protection to religious freedom,8 the question is what steps should be taken
now to increase that freedom. I will focus, in particular, on what role
congressional legislation has to play in protecting religious freedom. That
issue actually divides into two categories. Insofar as RFRA restrains the
application of federal laws to religious practice, it may still be valid after
Boerne; I argue that it is.9 Insofar as RFRA sought to restrain the application
of state and local laws, it is invalid, and Congress will have to legislate anew
if it wants to legislate the issue at all.
I. THE CASE FOR GENERAL FEDERAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LEGISLATION
The upshot of Boerne is that if Congress wants to protect religious
exercise against generally applicable laws passed by state and local govern-
ments, it will have to pass new legislation. There are some uncertainties about
the validity of such legislation and how far it can extend, as will be discussed
later.' ° Given such uncertainty, one might argue that it is not worth it for
Congress to attempt to legislate again. Perhaps Boerne indicates that the Court
is hostile to congressional attempts to step very far into this arena. Indeed,
some of the participants in this symposium urged that Congress forget about
legislating to protect religious freedom from generally applicable laws," or at
least forget about doing so in any across-the-board manner.' 2 Even some
commentators who have been critical or skeptical of Smith have suggested that
the best course is to try to get the Court to reverse itself, and not to rely on
further legislation, which might again be struck down and which would prevent
the Court from ever having occasion to reexamine Smith.'3
7. See id. at 2164, 2166.
8. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
693, 703-07 (1997); Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILLANOVA L. REv. 1, 21-26 (1994).
9. See infra part II.
10. See infra part III.
11. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility
of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LiTTLE ROCK L.J. 555, pt. 11 (1998).
12. See Marci Hamilton, The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion, 20 U. ARK LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 619, pt. 11 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman and Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free
Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 142 (1996) ("[T]he entrance of RFRA into the free
exercise jurisprudence may long prolong, if not extinguish, any opportunity to accept [certain
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Congress needs to move carefully in any future legislation concerning
state and local laws, given that the Court has already struck down one effort.
"Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me" is an appropriate
adage here. But I disagree with those who say that Congress should not try to
pass legislation along the lines of RFRA: that is, legislation that (a) requires
accommodation of religious practice in the face of generally applicable laws,
and (b) does so by enacting a general standard of protection to apply to a wide
range of religious claims, rather than specific rules for narrower categories of
cases. In view of the arguments raised against RFRA-type legislation, it is
worth recapping, if only partially, the reasons to support general, wide-ranging
legislation on the RFRA model.
A. Why Continue to Seek Accommodations from Generally Applica-
ble Laws?
There have already been countless writings making the basic case
(doctrinal and historical) for protecting religious exercise through accommoda-
tions from generally applicable laws in some cases. I will not rehash the issue
here, other than to respond to a few objections raised at this symposium.
Fred Gedicks argues that advocates of religious freedom ought to give up
on seeking accommodations from generally applicable laws. 4 Instead, he
suggests, they ought to seek maximum protection for religious practice within
the folds of Smith's interpretation of free exercise and within constitutional
doctrines such as equal protection and freedom of expression. 5 Gedicks
described his argument as more pragmatic than normative: not so much that
accommodations are illegitimate, but that the strategy of seeking accommoda-
tions is bound to have limited success. As I understand the argument, it is that
there is no persuasive justification for religious exemptions in the current social
and legal culture. There is no persuasive justification for privileging religion
by exempting religiously grounded conduct when similar conduct based on
secular grounds is regulated.'
6
justices'] invitations to re-examine and perhaps overrule Smith."); Marci A. Hamilton, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox Into the Henhouse under Cover of Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDozo L. REv. 357, 382 (1994) ("If Congress has
improved on the level of protection, it may in effect rob the examining courts of review of the
constitutional issue."). Cf Dan Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of
Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State
and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK L.J. 633, pt. 11 (1998) (arguing that Congress
should be cautious in passing new legislation, although it has some role to play).
14. See Gedicks, supra note 1I, at pt. II.
15. See id.; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Normalizing the Free Exercise Clause:
Three Abnormalities (unpublished manuscript).
16. In discussing these arguments, I am not intending to present the full case why
19981
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I doubt the claim that the accommodations principle is unpersuasive in
American culture generally. RFRA, which enacted the principle, passed with
only three dissenting votes in the two houses of Congress. 7 That hardly
indicates that the idea of accommodation enjoys no support in the broader
culture. In Dan Conkle's words, "RFRA demonstrates that contemporary
American values support the protection of religiously motivated conduct even
from laws of general application."'
8
There is more truth in the claim that the accommodations principle is
unpersuasive in legal culture. Judges do tend to see little reason for protecting
religiously grounded conduct when the same conduct based on other grounds
is regulated. As a result, judges tend, other things being equal, to be sparing
in declaring exemptions from generally applicable laws. That surely was the
course of events before RFRA, as the federal courts during the 1980s steadily
shrunk and then finally eliminated the category of constitutionally compelled
accommodations.
When the legislature enacts an exemption from regulation, however,
judges must sit up and take notice. Then the courts have received a directive
from the legislature that religious practice should be treated differently than
other forms of conduct. In the three years between RFRA's passage in
November 1993 and the time that RFRA litigation essentially went on hold
because of the pendency of Boerne, the statute was not interpreted especially
stringently, but it was still beginning to make a difference. It had been notably
effective in protecting religious ministries to the poor from being closed by the
most burdensome zoning rules' 9 and in protecting prisoners' ability to engage
accommodations of religion do not violate the Establishment Clause by "favoring" or
"advancing" religion. That, of course, is another subject on which others have written
extensively. This article is concerned mostly with the question whether Congress violates
structural principles of federalism or separation of powers by enacting a general accommodation
statute, not with whether it violates the Establishment Clause. For present purposes, I would
only say that some religious accommodations are violations of the Establishment Clause, but
that most are not, and that therefore general legislation on the RFRA model certainly is not
facially invalid as an establishment See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, No. 93-
2267, 1998 WL 166642 (8th Cir. Apr. 13, 1998) (upholding RFRA's application to federal law
against Establishment Clause Challenge).
17. RFRA passed the House by unanimous voice vote, and the Senate by a vote of 97-3.
See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1993, at A18.
18. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 91 (1995). Conkle argues
that RFRA therefore provides a reason for the Court to reverse Employment Division v. Smith's
constitutional holding, even though the statute itself was unconstitutional. See id. at 81-90.
19. See Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Board., 215 Mich. App. 54, 544 N.W.2d
698 (1996) (denial of permit to operate homeless shelter substantially burdened church's
religious exercise under RFRA even though shelter could be located elsewhere); Western
Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994) (issuing
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in entirely peaceful religious practices and wear religious symbols.2 ° It is
doubtful that any of these claims would have gotten anywhere under the pre-
Smith constitutional case law, even when the Court was still purporting to
apply the accommodations doctrine.2'
If the accommodations principle is not persuasive to our current legal
culture, it is partly because we have lost the substantive vision of religious
freedom articulated in the founding generation. That vision, as Michael
McConnell has shown, relied heavily on the affirmation that when the law
forbids conduct that is demanded by the believer's faith, the believer faces a
conflict of duties between those of society and those of a higher power.22 As
James Madison put it, the religious
duty is precedent, both in order of time and degree of obliga-
tion, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be
considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered
as a subject of the Govemour of the Universe. [Therefore],
every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil
Society [must] do it with a saving of his allegiance to the
Universal Sovereign.
23
This understanding of the nature and purpose of religious freedom points
toward the accommodations principle, for religious obligations are infringed
upon just as much by a generally applicable law as by one that targets religion
for prohibition. 24 In view of this basic outlook, Justice Scalia's argument in his
preliminary injunction against zoning board's exclusion of a soup kitchen that had operated
safely for 10 years).
20. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997)
(Muslim prisoners stated RFRA claim for prison's failure to provide amenities to make possible
dinners during Ramadan); Alameen v. Coughlin, 892 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting
preliminary injunction against rule forbidding Sufi Muslim prisoners from possessing and
displaying beads important to their faith).
21. Even before Smith, churches' challenges to restrictive zoning laws might fail under
the principle that the government did not "burden" free exercise unless it forced a religious
believer or community to violate particular tenets of the faith. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439,448-49 (1988); Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of
New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting church's challenge to land-use
ordinance, citing Swaggart as a bar independent of Smith). And the rejection of any
constitutionally compelled accommodations for prisoners' religious practices also predated
Smith. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
22. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990).
23. Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, para. 1.
24. For a vigorous presentation of this position (much but not all of the implications of
which I agree with), see Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense
of Religious Freedom, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1597 (1997) (reviewing John H. Garvey, WHAT
1998] 719
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concurring opinion in Boerne25 that the founders never explicitly endorsed
judicially compelled exemptions is beside the point. Given the relative
unfamiliarity of judicial review in 1791, and the relative infrequency of
conflicts between religious duties and general laws, the founders would not
have much need to endorse explicitly the constitutionally compelled exemp-
tion. The framers did approve of legislative exemptions, as McConnell has
shown.26 The accommodations principle best carries out the founders' vision
of religious freedom; and after judicial review was instituted, it became
appropriate for the courts to carry out that vision as well.
Finally, before we accept the assertion that religion is "privileged" by the
accommodations doctrine, we ought to look at the whole body of law under the
Religion Clauses. The government is forbidden, under settled Establishment
Clause doctrine, from teaching any religious doctrine as true or trying to
influence citizens to adopt religious beliefs. Six justices reaffirmed that
principle in Lee v. Weisman, stating that "[i]n religious debate or expression
[unlike in other areas] the government is not a prime participant, for the
Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom of all."27
Accordingly, the government may teach that democracy is a good idea,
or the free-market system, or racial equality, or devoting one's time or
resources to the poor are good ideas; and the government may compel citizens
ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)).
25. See 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1466-73.
27. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). It is true that, under this case law, the government may not teach
explicitly anti-religious doctrines either; the government may not promote official atheism. It
must not espouse any position on the questions of religion. But I would say to the extent (if
any) that an atheist or agnostic view on religion generates duties of conduct, or motivates the
believer in that position to engage in certain activities, that conduct should be protected as a
form of free exercise of religion as well. I do not believe, on the other hand, that all deeply-felt
ideological positions fall within the Religion Clauses--only all positions directed specifically
toward religious questions. Cf Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 313 (1996).
Professor Paulsen argues that the view of religion as involving duties to higher authority
(which he and I agree is crucial to explaining the Free Exercise Clause) necessarily leads to the
view that only theism, and not atheism, is protected by the First Amendment. See Paulsen,
supra note 24. This is a large subject, but I here would mention a couple of points where I think
his argument falls short. First, he does not distinguish the narrow and tenable protection of
explicit atheism from the broad (and, I agree, untenable) protection of secular viewpoints that
do not address the religious question. See id. at 1599 (suggesting that his opponents' position
necessarily involves giving free exercise protection to "rationalism" and "humanism" as well
as "atheism"). Second, as Professor Paulsen concedes, the Religion Clauses rest significantly
on the premises that "government is untrustworthy" in telling people how to obey God's will
and that state coercion leads one away from, rather than towards, true religion. Id. at 1610.
Under those premises, the quest for the divine, the quest to understand and obey the rules of
living that follow from the deepest truths about the universe, should be protected even if that
quest leads one to the explicit, sincere belief that no divine being exists.
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to give financial support to any one of these notions in a preferential way, by
taxing citizens to support programs that promote or advance these ideas and
that work against their opposites. But the government may not teach that
Christianity is true, or that religious ideas are better than non-religious ones.
And it may not compel taxpayers to support religion or any particular religion
as such. (That is different, of course, from the case where religiously affiliated
institutions engage in an activity that the government is generally paying for,
such as education or child care; in that case, religious institutions may be
included in a tax-supported program of funding, and perhaps must be included,
on the same terms as other groups.)
The principle that keeps government out of influencing religious belief
and practice on the Establishment Clause side is the same principle that justifies
accommodations of the free exercise of religion. It is the principle that
government should, as much as possible, avoid creating incentives for people
to practice religion or not practice religion.28 When government applies a
general law so as to make religiously motivated practice punishable by jail or
a fine, it prima facie creates an incentive for people not to engage in that
practice. Regulating religion in this way may be justified where it is necessary
to protect the rights of others, or where an exemption would create such a
shelter for self-interested behavior that it would produce an incentive to
practice religion. But such situations can be handled by the compelling interest
test or by other standards setting appropriate limits on religious exercise.
If accommodations are forbidden as a matter of constitutional law, or if
they are viewed as impermissible as a matter of legal culture, then our overall
view of relations between the government and religion is skewed. Government
must single out religious ideas from all other ideas for the purpose of not
espousing them, or subsidizing them in themselves; but if accommodations are
improper, government may not single out religious beliefs and ideas for the
purpose of avoiding interference with them.
The more accommodations are forbidden, then, the more pressure there
will be for government to promote favored religious views by teaching them
or directly subsidizing them. Such pressure is the inevitable outgrowth of the
view that religious views must be treated equally with every other view.
People will ask: if religion is just the same for constitutional purposes as
everything else, why can the government not teach religious beliefs that the
majority of the community believes are true, just as it teaches patriotism,
democracy, free enterprise, or racial equality because the majority of the
28. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001-06 (1990); Michael W. McConnell and Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CFH. L. REv. 1, 37-38
(1989); Berg, Anti-Theories, supra note 8, at 703-07.
1998]
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community believes those ideas to be true? And if the government can
promote child care as a good by subsidizing it over other activities, why can it
not promote the majority's favored religious position as a good by subsidizing
it as opposed to other activities?
If matters move in this direction, it will not be a happy development for
religious freedom, and not for minority religions in particular. There are a host
of reasons to support a principle under which government must minimize its
influence over religious beliefs and practices. That overarching principle
extends to protecting religiously motivated conduct from prohibition or
restriction, even by generally applicable laws, except where the religious
conduct infringes on the rights of others or exemption would create an
incentive to practice religion. I believe that this principle can be persuasive in
our society when the grounds for it are articulated.
B. Why Across-the-Board Accommodations Rather Than Specific
Ones?
RFRA-type legislation is not the only kind of accommodation that
legislatures might provide. Indeed, more commonly legislatures protect
religion from neutral laws in a specific rather than a general way. That is, the
legislature addresses a burden that a particular statutory or regulatory rule
places on a particular kind of religious practice, and it enacts a rather precisely
defined exemption in that particular statute. Such specific or "targeted"
provisions appear throughout federal and state laws, from the Title VII
exemption for religious employment preferences by religious organizations
29
to exemptions for churches in some architectural preservation laws.30
Many of the objections to RFRA that I address here are complaints that
Congress enacted a general accommodation rather than any targeted ones. That
is, Congress legislated a standard for courts to balance religious claims against
government purposes, rather than creating a specific rule resolving that
balance, and Congress did so for a wide range of religious claims, not for any
claim in a specific context. 3' Therefore, it is worth summarizing at the outset
the case for "general," rather than "specific," religious freedom legislation.
There are two lines of argument.
29. See Title VII, § 702,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
30. See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174
(1992) (considering such an exemption in city ordinance).
3 1. See infra part II (discussing this objection against the survival of RFRA as applied to
federal laws and regulations).
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First, general legislation is more likely to produce overall protection for
religious practice. The leading academic proponent of general legislation,
Professor Douglas Laycock, testified to Congress,
If [religious] exemptions must be obtained piecemeal, one
statute at a time, they are not a workable means of protecting
religious liberty. In every such request for a legislative
exemption, churches are likely to find an aroused interest group
on the other side, and they will be trying to amend that interest
group's statute .... Churches have to win these fights over and
over, at every level of government. They have to avoid being
regulated by the Congress, by the state legislature, by the
county commissioners, by the city council, and by the adminis-
trative agencies at each of those levels. They have to avoid
being regulated this year and next year and every year after that
The situation is even more hopeless for individual
religious believers with special needs not shared by their whole
denomination .... [Such claimants] cannot hire lobbyists to
monitor the legislature and protect their religious liberty from
any bill that might interfere with their little known belief. The
only way to provide for such unforeseeable religious claims is
with a general provision guaranteeing the free exercise of
religion.32
Second, general legislation is more likely than specific exemptions to
produce even-handed protection for various faiths. When the legislature
addresses burdens on religion selectively, it is more likely to address com-
plaints raised by faiths that are numerically powerful or politically adept. The
result may be a troubling pattern of unequal exemptions. The Court has noted
this risk from case-by-case exemptions,33 and the Court has even treated this as
a reason to strike down exemptions that on their face are targeted to protect
only one faith.34
32. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 10-11 (1992) (testimony of Douglas Laycock).
33. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (conceding that case-by-case exemptions "will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in").
34. See Board of Education, Kiryas Joel School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 707, 114
S. Ct. 2481, 2493 (1994) (for any accommodation to satisfy the Establishment Clause,
"neutrality as among religions must be honored"); id. at 2491 (noting that "[t]he anomalously
case-specific nature of [legislative authority]" makes it difficult for Court to be confident that
neutrality between religions is being respected).
1998]
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Unlike some commentators," I do not believe that statute-specific
exemptions inherently violate the Establishment Clause. The legislature may
have focused on a particular conflict between religious practice and a statute
for a great many reasons--for example, because that conflict was immediately
pressing, or because the legislature was already amending or focusing on the
statute in question.3 6 But it is true that favoritism in exemptions is a real
concern. General legislation reduces such favoritism. In the words of the
religious and civil liberties coalition that pushed RFRA's enactment, general
legislation "allows any faith, no matter how small, unpopular or politically
ineffectual, to press its claims before a neutral arbiter under an objective and
religiously neutral standard. The consideration and adjudication of [such]





General legislation, then, has both moral and political advantages. By
treating all religious claims (or at least a wide range of them) under the same
overarching standard to be applied by courts, it increases the likelihood of
equal treatment in the accommodation of religious practice. This also makes
it much easier--indeed it may be necessary--to gather a broad coalition to
support religious freedom legislation.38
C. Why Through Federal Legislation?
Of course, there are other ways to reinstitute a general legal rule that
accommodations should be afforded except in cases of overriding government
necessity. Advocates of religious freedom could seek to convince the Court to
abandon Smith and return to the rule requiring accommodations; failing that,
they could seek to amend the Constitution to reverse Smith. Or they could
work at the level of individual states, pushing for such a general standard
through state statutes or constitutional amendments.
The constitutional amendment process is obviously long and arduous, and
nothing would happen unless the required three-fourths of the states ratified the
35. Most notably, Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 605-06 (1991); and
Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743 (1992).
36. See Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel
School Dist. v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433, 471-72 (1995).
37. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion at 11, City
of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 95-2074).
38. On the political necessity of general legislation, see Berg, Guide to RFRA, supra note
8, at 15; Douglas Laycock and Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 219 (1994) (general standard was necessary because
"many activists--and many legislatom--are much quicker to protect the religions they like than
to protect religions they reject").
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amendment. The constitutional amendment process illustrates the power that
can be exercised by a few interest groups who are opposed to religious freedom
in the cases that concern them. Groups from prison wardens to the architec-
tural preservation lobby to public educators to animal rights activists could
force exceptions to be written into the amendment at the front end--or more
likely, they could defeat it entirely at the back end by blocking passage in just
a few states. The experience could be similar to that of the Equal Rights
Amendment, which shot out of the starting gate in 1972 but ran into insur-
mountable difficulties getting the last few states to ratify.39 The amendment
process would also tend to sweep in other issues in the contentious area of
church and state, such as various forms of prayer in public schools and
financial aid to religious schools-a concern expressed by a number of
members of Congress at hearings held last year in the wake of Boerne.'°
The state legislative or amendment process is more likely to produce
tangible results, but it too would move very slowly. It also is practically
guaranteed to produce uneven results, with lobbies that are powerful in
particular states enjoying greater ability to force exceptions to the religious
freedom law. Already some states have proposed to exempt prisoner claims;4
in other states, lobbyists for groups on the other side of particular disputes may
be able to demand exceptions.
Any overruling or significant modification of Smith by the Court has to
be considered unlikely, although it is not impossible. In 1994, I estimated that
the votes were still 5 to 4 in favor of Smith's rule.42 In Boerne, six justices
adhered to Smith at least to the point of rejecting Congress's attempt to legislate
a stricter rule; they joined the majority opinion's statement that Smith must be
followed out of the "respect due" the Court's precedents and that "contrary
expectations must be disappointed."' 3 Thus Smith has already entered the
realm of decisions reaffirmed under the doctrine of stare decisis. Perhaps a
couple of the six justices would rethink their position if they were faced with
a head-on challenge that asked the Court to change the Smith rule itself rather
than to bow to Congress's initiative in changing it. And there surely is creative
litigation work to be done in shaping the rules of Smith to be more religion-
protective, particularly through the exceptions that seem to preserve heightened
scrutiny for "individualized" governmental decisions and "hybrid" constitu-
39. See, e.g., JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1987).
40. See Protecting Religious Freedom After City of Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
(July 14, 1997) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/2.htn>.
41. See id. (statement of Jeffrey Sutton, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio).
42. See Berg, Guide to RFRA, supra note 8, at 22.
43. 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
1998]
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tional claims." Nevertheless, it does not seem a good bet to rely solely on
litigation to restore protection for religious freedom.
D. The Future Issues Facing RFRA and New Religious Freedom
Legislation
For these reasons, Congress still has an important role to play in
protecting religious freedom from generally applicable laws. Moreover, it
should do so through an overreaching standard, and not solely through case-by-
case exemptions. If Congress steps out of the picture now, it will essentially
have acquiesced in the notion that its role in protecting religious freedom
beyond the Court's constitutional doctrine is limited to the piecemeal, case-by-
case approach. Congress should not be limited to that role. It can be an
expositor of general principles as well: indeed, we should encourage Congress
to act from principle more frequently, and certainly in the area of religious
freedom, where it is important to avoid discriminatory treatment among
different faiths. And as I will discuss, City ofBoerne v. Flores should not be
read in a broad way that forbids such general legislation per se.
The overall theme of this article is the legitimacy, and the value, of
Congress making religious accommodations through general measures rather
than only through targeted exemptions. How does that theme apply to future
questions concerning Congress's power to legislate to protect religious freedom
beyond the protection given by Smith?
Boerne has told us that legislating the compelling interest test across the
board exceeds Congress's Section 5 power. The most important remaining
issues, then, concern whether general religious freedom legislation can survive
if it is enacted or defended under some other source of congressional power.
And that in turn breaks down, conceptually and practically, into two issues.
First, if Congress lacked the power to enact RFRA's standard to restrain
state and local laws, did it nevertheless have the power to restrain its own laws
and the agencies it has created-4n other words, does RFRA remain valid as
applied to federal law? The issue here is not the constitutionality of new
legislation, but the constitutionality of the remaining part of RFRA not
addressed in Boerne.
Second, if Congress lacked the power to apply a heightened scrutiny test
to state and local laws under Section 5, may it nevertheless enact such a test as
a rule of decision for state laws in certain categories of cases under more
44. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82, 884-85. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v.
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d at 174 (relying on both categories to apply compelling interest analysis
and strike down historic perservation ordinance as applied to churches).
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discrete powers? This issue, of course, involves the potential enactment of new
legislation. Attention has focused here primarily on the Spending and
Commerce powers. Through the Spending Power, Congress might enact the
compelling interest test indirectly, by requiring that state agencies that receive
federal funds not burden religion without a compelling reason. The Commerce
Power option is more direct; Congress might provide that any religious activity
that affects interstate commerce may not be burdened by state or local laws,
even generally applicable laws, unless there is a compelling need for the state
to do so. In addition, Congress can take some steps under the Section 5 power
to enforce the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.
The remainder of this article considers the various sources of power that
would support (1) the continued validity of RFRA as applied to federal laws
and (2) the validity of new religious freedom legislation as applied to state
laws.
II. THE SURVIVAL OF RFRA AS TO FEDERAL LAW: OBJECTIONS BASED ON
ENUMERATED POWERS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
I turn first to the question whether, after Boerne, RFRA remains valid as
applied to federal laws and regulations. The question has arisen primarily in
a series of cases where bankruptcy trustees have sought to use the fraudulent
conveyance provision of the Bankruptcy Code45 to recover tithes made by
bankrupt debtors to their churches in the year before the debtor's bankruptcy
filing. In the leading decision on the subject, Christians, Trustee v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, the Eighth Circuit recently upheld RFRA's
application to federal laws.46
Although the Supreme Court in Boerne had sent the issue back to the
lower courts for reconsideration,47 there is little in Boerne itself to suggest that
RFRA is invalid as applied to federal law. Boerne concerned the application
of RFRA to a historic preservation designation enacted by the city of Boerne,
a subdivision of the state of Texas. The case therefore involved, in the Court's
words, "the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions, those
which impose its requirements on the states."'4 Congress had relied on Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to justify RFRA's application to states. But
the Court held, as noted earlier,49 that Section 5 only extends to enforcing the
substantive principles of the Fourteenth Amendment (here, the incorporated
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(1994).
46. See Christians, 1998 WL 166642.
47. See Christians, Trustee v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
48. 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
49. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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Free Exercise Clause) as the Court declares those principles, not as Congress
interprets them.
Whether or not Boerne was a correct interpretation of the Section 5 power,
its reasoning has little application to the validity of RFRA with respect to
federal law. The application of RFRA to federal law obviously does not rest
on Section 5 and could not have been intended to do so, since the Fourteenth
Amendment is only concerned with state action. As applied to federal laws,
RFRA rests on a combination of Article I powers, as I will discuss shortly.
Moreover, the issue in federal applications of RFRA is whether Congress can
pass a statute that restrains its own laws--the laws that itself has passed, and
the agencies that enforce those laws--from infringing on religious freedom as
Congress understands the term.
Boerne emphasized at length that RFRA's application to states was "a
considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives
and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens."5
The fact that Congress was imposing its judgment on other bodies, who are
entitled to respect under structural principles of federalism, is precisely what
made the application to states "the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA's
provisions."'" Section 5 authorizes Congress to limit states' autonomy, but the
justices held that this cannot authorize Congress to enforce whatever it believes
the Constitution means, or else congressional power would be unlimited.52
Accordingly, the Section 5 power is limited to enforcing the Constitution in
ways "proportional to" the Court's interpretation. This conclusion, the Court
said, also followed from the text, which explicitly limits Congress to enforcing
the Constitution, and from the background of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which showed concern that the congressional power under the Amendment
should not intrude too far "into traditional areas of state responsibility."53
In short, in Boerne the operative legal limit on Congress's power was that
it must be used to enforce the Constitution. The controlling decision about the
meaning of the Constitution had to be made by someone-either by Congress
or by the Court. For the limit on Congress's power to have any independent
meaning, the Court reasoned, the interpretation of it must be in the hands of the
judiciary, not Congress. 4
50. 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
51. Id. at 2162.
52. See id. at 2168.
53. Id. at2164-65.
54. This argument can be challenged, to be sure. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 11l HARV.
L. REV. 153 (1998) (arguing that the Court should defer to reasonable congressional
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment in close cases, and that this would not give
Congress carte blanche to act as it liked).
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By contrast, the application of RFRA to federal law does not rest on a
power that is limited to enforcing the Constitution: it rests, as will be discussed
in a moment, on various other Article I powers. Moreover, the application of
RFRA to federal law does not expand congressional power, but makes it
possible for Congress to limit its own power, its own laws, so as not to infringe
on religious freedom. The federal application of RFRA does not impose
Congress's view on other governments; it is an act of congressional self-
restraint. Most of the major reasons given in Boerne for limiting Congress to
enforcing the Court's interpretation of the Constitution are simply not relevant
when RFRA is applied to federal law.
Nonetheless, opponents of RFRA have raised two other arguments against
the application of the statute to federal law---arguments that do not depend on
the federalism concerns that marked the Court's reasoning in Boerne. The first
argument is that even as applied to federal law, RFRA does not fall within any
of Congress's enumerated powers. The primary proponent of this position is
Professor Marci Hamilton, who successfully argued Boerne in the Supreme
Court. She argues that because RFRA is not targeted at any single specific
statute, it is not based on any single enumerated power. Rather, it is an attempt
to exercise power to "enforce" the First Amendment-but there is no such
enumerated power, since the Amendment is a limitation on Congress rather
than a grant of power.5
The second argument is that when Congress attempts to set a general rule
protecting religious freedom that is more protective than the Court's free
exercise standard, the legislation violates the separation of powers by invading
the courts' realm of constitutional interpretation. According to the leading
proponents of this view, RFRA impermissibly tried-and as applied to federal
law, tries--to "'control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a
construction' of the Free Exercise Clause... to reflect Congress' 'own views'
as to how the Clause should be construed."56 Congress, it is asserted, tried to
"displace the judiciary's decision with its own policy determination that a
different standard ought to be applied in cases involving religious freedom."
57
Thus "Congress has interfered with the 'province and duty' of the judiciary,"
55. See Hamilton, Fox and Henhouse, supra note 13, at 364 ("RFRA is a bare standard
of review yoked to no particular substantive policy arena within which Congress is
constitutionally empowered to act."); id. at 368 (arguing "that the First Amendment is not an
enumerated power and that RFRA is not anchored by a specific Article I enumerated power.
56. Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 122 (quoting THOMAS COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 94-95 (1868)).
57. Marci A. Hamilton, Is the RFRA Constitutional?, CATO POL. REP., May/June 1997,
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set forth in Marbury v. Madison,58 "to 'say what the law is' in free exercise
cases and controversies.'
As I said, these two arguments overlap substantially. Both, as I will show,
essentially claim that although Congress can enact specific legislation to protect
religious freedom in specific circumstances where the Court would not find a
constitutional right, Congress cannot legislate such protection on a general
basis. It cannot legislate a general standard protecting religious freedom across
a wide range of circumstances.
The "separation of powers" objection is a distillation of the position that
it is not Congress's business, but only the Court's, to set general standards
protecting constitutionally recognized rights. But the separation of powers
objection rests significantly on the assertion that when Congress enacts such
a general standard, it is trying simply to alter the First Amendment, rather than
to alter any statute enacted under an enumerated power.6° Thus, the separation
of powers objection is intertwined with the assertion that a general, across-the-
board religious freedom statute cannot rest on any enumerated power.
In the following discussion, I will treat the two objections separately:
arguing first that Congress can support the application to federal laws by
reference to its enumerated powers, and second that legislating a general,
across-the-board statutory right does not interfere with the judicial power. But
the arguments in the two sections will overlap, because the essence of both
objections to RFRA is the same. Similarly, the essence of the answer is the
same. Congress has the power to use its enumerated powers to restrain its own
laws from burdening religious freedom, and it can do so by a general, across-
the-board standard; it is not limited to acting in specific categories of cases. To
hold that Congress may restrain itself only in specific categories and not
generally would be an unprecedented intrusion on Congress's choice of the
appopriate means to carry out its powers.
A. The Enumerated Powers Objection
The first objection, remember, asserts that RFRA, as applied to federal
law, does not fall within any enumerated power of Congress. It is true, as
Professor Hamilton asserts, that Congress does not have any separate power to
58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
59. Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 121 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
60. "RFRA cannot be said to have effectively amended any applicable substantive law.
The only possible substantive law in this instance is the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. And Congress simply cannot amend the Constitution by substituting its own
interpretation for that of the Supreme Court." Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 136-
37.
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enforce the First Amendment as such. 6' The Amendment itself is only a
limitation on congressional power. That means that outside the enforcement
power of Section 5, Congress cannot exercise power to force states to obey the
First Amendment.
But when Congress applies RFRA to federal law, it is not "forcing" the
First Amendment on any government, except for itself. It is respecting the
limits placed on it by the First Amendment, by amending its own laws to
conform to its own conscientious understanding of what the free exercise of
religion requires. 6 Congress has the power to amend its own laws in this way
because it had power to enact the laws in the first place. When it passes a law
within one of its Article I powers (such as, for example, the Bankruptcy
Code63), Congress can decide, then or later, to restrict the reach of the law. In
other words, the power to amend a particular federal law in a way that protects
religious freedom rests on whatever Article I power authorized the enactment
of the law originally."M To continue with the bankruptcy example, Congress
would certainly act within its Article I powers if it amended the fraudulent
conveyance provision of the Bankruptcy Code to exclude tithes to churches
from the category of pre-petition transfers that can be overturned by trustees.
65
61. See Hamilton, Fox and Henhouse, supra note 13, at 362-63.
62. Consider, by analogy, a statute by which Congress sets a compensation measure for
interferences with property by federal agencies-one that courts have held is not
constitutionally required. Congress surely can amend its laws this way, even though there is
no enumerated power to enforce the Takings Clause.
63. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (granting the power to "establish ... uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States").
64. For previous statements of this position, see Bonnie L. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of
the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv.
589, 677-79 n.358 (1996); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress,
Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1625 n.401
(1995); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REv. 145, 155-56
(1995); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 171, 213 (1995); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 249, 253 (1995); Berg,
An Interpretive Guide, supra note 8, at 73 n.274.
65. Indeed, legislation is advancing quickly that would do just that (and protect
contributions to other charities as well). See Bill to Amend Code to Protect Charitable
Donations Passes by Senate Judiciary Panel, BNA BKRTCY. L. DAILY, Mar. 2, 1998.
Opponents have suggested that the federal applications of RFRA cannot survive based
on Article I powers because Congress never articulated the Article I theory of power. But
Congress did premise RFRA in part on the Necessary and Proper Clause. See H.R. Rep. No.
103-88, at 9 (1993). That reference suggests, by the very terms of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, that Congress was relying on RFRA as a way of implementing changes to laws enacted
under its other Article I powers. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting the power to make
laws necessary and proper to carry out other Article I powers). In any event, it would be both
inappropriate and pointless to strike down a statute well within Congress's power on the ground
that Congress did not articulate at length a legal theory that is an obvious basis. Congressional
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When Congress determines the scope of its own validly-enacted laws, it
may act to refrain from infringing on religious freedom as it understands that
concept-even if the Supreme Court would not hold the infringement to be a
constitutional violation. Boerne makes this clear: the Court said that "[w]hen
Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the
right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and
force of the Constitution."' As applied to federal law, RFRA does what the
Court suggested. Within Congress's sphere--the laws it enacts and the
agencies and regulations that enforce those laws-it made the judgment that
religious freedom should not be restricted even by generally applicable laws.
A key difference from Boerne, as noted above, is that Congress is
restraining itself and limiting its own power; it is not enforcing its judgment on
the states and thereby expanding its power. And unlike the grant of power in
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the various grants in Article I, Section
8 do not confine Congress to enforcing the Constitution. In deciding to restrict
the scope of its own validly-enacted laws, Congress can act based on its own
"informed judgment" of what is constitutionally required, what is conducive
to human liberty more generally, or simply what is good policy.
Of course Congress has regularly limited the scope of its Article I laws,
originally or through later amendment, to protect religious freedom in cases
where the courts had found or would find no constitutional violation.67 After
the Court held that soldiers have no constitutional right to wear religiously-
mandated headgear while on peacetime duty,68 Congress legislated the same
ight by statute under its powers to support and regulate the military.70 After
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar the U.S. Forest Service
from obliterating Native Americans' religious practices by destroying their
sacred sites, 7' Congress exercised its power over federal appropriations and
statutes should be presumed constitutional, and courts should look for ways to save them. See,
e.g., Woods v. Cloyd Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 145 (1948) ("The question of constitutionality
of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to
exercise."); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18 (1982). This is not a situation
where Congress's power to act depends significantly on factual findings that are absent. Nor
is there any doubt about the severability of RFRA's federal applications: Congress would
surely have wanted the statute to continue to apply to federal laws even if it could not apply to
state and local laws. See Christians, 1998 WL 166642 (holding federal applications of RFRA
severable).
66. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
67. See Christians, 1998 WL 166642 (citing the following examples).
68. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1985).
69. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 14.
71. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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federal lands72 to defund the project in question.73 The Court has regularly
upheld such exemptions in federal laws even when they are not constitutionally
required, stating that there is "ample room" for accommodation of religion
beyond the dictates of the Free Exercise Clause.74
The objectors to federal application of RFRA concede all this. But their
position is that everything changes when Congress protects religious exercise
not by setting a specific rule for a specific statute or set of circumstances, but
by setting a general standard to apply across all federal statutes. In such a case,
Professor Hamilton says, the statute is invalid because it "is not anchored by
a specific Article I enumerated power" and "has only a potential and tangential
relation to all existing statutes presumably enacted under an enumerated
power., 75 For the same reason, Professors Gressman and Carmella state,
RFRA does not "effectively amend[ ] any substantive law" but simply tries to
amend the First Amendment. 6
This argument would work an unprecedented intrusion into Congress's
choice of the means to carry out policies that are concededly within its Article
I powers. Congress concededly has the power to restrain its own laws to avoid
burdening religious freedom. It is not limited to doing so by the means that
RFRA's opponents think are best or wisest.
To begin with, the Article I powers do not require that Congress legislate
a precise result for a category of cases rather than a general standard to apply
to those cases. For example, in exercising control over the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress is not limited to enacting a rule that pre-petition religious tithes are
protected from recovery by the trustee under section 548. Congress could
examine the Bankruptcy Code more generally and decide that it should not be
used in any situation to burden religious freedom substantially without a
compelling or overriding reason. Or with respect to Title VII, Congress is not
limited to enacting a rule that religious organizations and religiously-affiliated
colleges may use religious preferences in employment.7 7 It could also enact a
rule that Title VII may not be applied in any way that would substantially
burden religious exercise without compelling need.
72. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1; art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
73. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-713, at 72 (1988).
74. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (upholding Title VII exemption for religious
organizations from rule against religious discrimination in employment); see also Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1970) (upholding draft exemption for conscientious objectors to
all wars).
75. Hamilton, Fox and Henhouse, supra note 13, at 368.
76. Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13.
77. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l, 2000e-2(e)(2) (1994).
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In each of the above cases, the standard that RFRA applies to the federal
statute in question is more general than the specific exemption mentioned. But
there is nothing strange about Congress setting forth general standards for
courts to apply to particular facts. To take just one example from Title VII
itself, the statute now says that any employment practice with a disparate
impact on a protected group is invalid unless it is justified by "business
necessity"8--a standard quite similar to what RFRA enacts for burdens on
religious practice. To decide whether this provision has been violated, courts
have to determine what is a sufficiently different impact to be "disparate"
(including determining to what measure an effect on blacks should be
compared); they also have to determine, given the particular set of facts, what
constitutes a business necessity. The statute itself sets out only two or three
simple phrases, leaving the courts to work out their application to various fact
patterns in the light of the statutory purpose. That is no different from what
RFRA does in asking courts to determine what are substantial burdens on
religious exercise and what are compelling governmental interests that would
justify such burdens.
It is far too late in the day to suggest that Congress can enact only precise,
concrete rules in its legislation. In the last 60 years, Congress has regularly
enacted, and the courts have consistently approved, federal statutes that set very
general standards to be interpreted and applied by courts and administra-
tors-standards that have often offered far less guidance than RFRA does.
79
"Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves
the least possible delegation of discretion [to other officials] ."o
To the extent that RFRA's opponents object to its use of a general
balancing standard rather than precise rules, they are essentially seeking to
revive the non-delegation doctrine for this context alone. In fact, they are
seeking to revive a version of the non-delegation doctrine unprecedented in its
strictness. As the Court reaffirmed in Mistretta v. United States," Congress is
permitted to set general standards to be implemented by others-so long as it
states an "intelligible principle"-because there are many advantages to be
gained by general legislation as well.82 In the case of RFRA, Congress deemed
that it was best to create a general standard that could be applied in particular
cases by courts, with their expertise in developing and interpreting the facts of
each case. And though RFRA's standard is general, it is perfectly intelligible:
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
79. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1989) (citing numerous statutes
under which Congress "delegate[s] power under broad general standards").
80. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,425-26 (1944).
81. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
82. See id. at 372-73.
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the contours of the compelling interest standard have been fleshed out in
previous decisions and in commentary. 3
Congress not only has the power to enact a general standard, it can also
determine that for the sake of fairness, the standard should be the same across
the range of federal statutes and regulations. As was argued in Part 1,84 the
process of creating legislative exemptions statute by statute, tailored to each
statute, creates a risk that many claims will go unprotected, especially claims
of isolated individuals and of groups that are numerically small or politically
weak or unorganized. Employment Division v. Smith itself conceded that the
case-by-case process of exemption will disfavor minority religious practices.85
Congress, relying on its familiarity with how the legislative process works, also
concluded that protecting religion solely through targeted exemptions will be
insufficient, unworkable, and unequal. 86 It determined that the application of
the same general test to all claims, in the relatively neutral forum of federal and
state courts, will increase protection for many claims, minimize religious
favoritism, and minimize the amount of political conflict between religious
groups and government.
Each of these purposes is surely sufficient to justify Congress choosing to
legislate according to the same across-the-board standard. Legislating in such
a way that will achieve fairness and consistency of approach throughout its
Article I statutes falls well within Congress's power to make laws that are
16 1187necessary and proper for carrying into execution the [Article I] powers.
The next and final step is simple. Since Congress has the power to
legislate the same standard to apply to all of its own laws, it surely can then
determine to set forth that standard in a separate code provision rather than
insert it one by one in every federal statute. The Necessary and Proper Clause
unquestionably allows Congress to determine that a separate provision is more
efficient. Otherwise, Congress would be put to the pointless task of specifying
the compelling interest standard over and over again in each statute.
The arguments offered as to why RFRA does not fall within Congress's
enumerated powers all boil down to criticisms of the wisdom of Congress in
83. For a discussion of how to interpret the compelling interest standard, see Berg, Guide
to RFRA, at supra note 8.
84. See supra part I-B.
85. See 494 U.S. at 890.
86. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993) ("It is not feasible to combat the burdens of
generally applicable laws on religion by relying upon the political process for the enactment of
separate religious exemptions in every Federal, State, and local statute."); see also S. Rep. No.
103-11I, at 8 (1993) ("State and local bodies cannot be relied upon to craft exceptions from
laws of general application to protect the ability of religious minorities to protect their faith.").
Although the latter statement mentions state bodies only, the point applies equally well to
Congress.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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choosing to legislate by a general standard rather than case-by-case rules.
Professor Hamilton, for example, argues that "[h]ad Congress acted under one
of its well-settled enumerated power categories, rather than in this generalized
way, a particular lobbying sector would have taken notice of the practical
effect of RFRA" and would have more effectively questioned the necessity for
the legislation and for its scope. 8 The argument appears to be that RFRA
imposed burdens on other interests who were not aware of it because the statute
was not targeted at them.89
At the same time, however, Professor Hamilton argues that the generality
of RFRA concealed the fact that its protections were only "negligibly better
than the [Smith] Court's unacceptable standard," because the compelling
interest test had never protected religious liberty very greatly and because
Congress retained the power to make "at-will" exceptions from RFRA in the
future. 90 In short, Congress can claim credit for "saving" religious liberty
without actually having done so.
These two claims--that RFRA will do very little to shield religious
exercise and that it will impose large hidden burdens on others---are inconsis-
tent and cancel each other out. Thus I am not sure exactly what Professor
Hamilton thinks about the vigor of RFRA. In fact, the statute was turning out
to offer "moderate" protection for religion, protecting some religious claims
and imposing some reasonable costs on government's general social goals,
much as I predicted it would (and advocated that it should). 91
This moderation could have been expected from the legislative dynamics.
It is not true that RFRA simply reflected a united religious front running
roughshod over the interests of diffuse, uninvolved groups. Various groups on
the other side of particular free exercise disputes, including the National School
Boards Association and the architectural preservation lobby, saw the effect
RFRA might have on their concerns and pushed successfully to modify both
the text and the legislative history. 92 Prison administrators tried to get their
88. See Hamilton, Fox and Henhouse, supra note 13, at 383.
89. See Hamilton, CATO POL. REV., at 9 ("[In RFRA t]he organized religions have come
together with the most dangerous branch of government, Congress, to elevate their power in
their communities. That is the very union of power that was most feared by the Framers.").
90. See Hamilton, Fox and Henhouse, supra note 13, at 381. ("The public has been lulled
into believing that the constitutional problem has been solved, without being fully informed that
more should have been expected.").
91. See Berg, supra note 8, at 30-31 (arguing that RFRA called for real but "moderate"
protection for religious exercise).
92. For example, negotiations with school boards resulted in a change to the "findings"
section of the statute, substituting the endorsement of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1 972)--a decision troubling to public educators--with a more generic endorsement of "the
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(a)(5)
(1994); see Berg, supra note 8, at 27. The efforts of the land-use regulation lobby and other
[Vol. 20
FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
institutions exempted from RFRA's coverage entirely, and the Senate
considered their argument in a rather lengthy and substantive debate before
rejecting it.
93
Moreover, it must be remembered that the benefits of RFRA were
"diffuse" as well, since no religious group could predict victory under the
general standard. The RFRA coalition was therefore constantly subject to
threats from members, especially the Catholic Church and some pro-life
organizations, that they would drop their support unless the statute included
specific language enacting their favored positions on abortion, funding of
religious organizations, and tax exemptions for churches. 94 In the face of such
pressures, and needing to hold the coalition together in order to pass any
legislation at all, RFRA's advocates could not press hard for anything more
specific than the compelling interest test.
But more importantly, all this discussion of whether RFRA was a wise or
effective statute, overly burdensome on non-religious interests or virtually
negligible in its effect, is beside the point. Congress's power is not limited to
passing wise statutes. Under the most accepted, noncontroversial readings of
McCulloch v. Maryland,95 the wisdom of a statute is a matter within Congress's
discretion and does not affect whether Congress has power to pass it. The
statute need be only minimally rational unless it violates some independent
constitutional boundary.
If RFRA in a given situation imposes serious or direct costs on other
persons, disproportionate to the burdens removed from religious freedom, that
would be a reason to strike down that particular application under the
Establishment Clause.96 But such cases will occur seldom. RFRA is only
triggered when the burden government is imposing on religion is "substantial."
And preventing direct invasion of the liberty or property interests of third
parties will often qualify as a compelling state interest--at the least, there was
every indication that courts would read the statute that way. A great many
religious accommodations oppose only minimal costs on others, or only diffuse
costs absorbed by the whole of society. Thus there is no reason for striking
down RFRA on its face under the Establishment Clause.97
interests is evident in the narrowing of coverage from "burdens" on religion to "substantial
burdens"-after the House of Representatives committee had issued its report- and the
inclusion of language in the later Senate Report endorsing at least some land use laws. See
Berg, supra note 8, at 54-55.
93. See 139 CONG. REc. S14,350-68, S14,461-68 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
94. For description of the dynamics, see Berg, supra note 8, at 15-16.
95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316(1819).
96. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1989) (plurality opinion
of Brennan, J.); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1984).
97. See Christians, 1998 WL 166642 (rejecting the facial Establishment Clause
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RFRA's critics may raise legitimate criticisms about the effectiveness of
such general legislation. But as we have seen, there are also considerable
policy reasons to favor general legislation, for it is likely to protect many
otherwise unprotected claims and overall give protection more fairly and
consistently. Congress can legitimately seek these latter objectives. There is
no constitutional reason why Congress should be required to forego them in
order to pursue objectives that RFRA's critics prefer.
B. The Separation of Powers Objection
The second chief objection to the federal application of RFRA is that it
violates the separation of powers, by adopting the across-the-board legal
standard for free exercise claims that the Supreme Court had rejected in Smith
and thereby interfering with the judicial power to "say what the law is"-in
particular, to interpret the Constitution. This objection sounds conceptually
different from the objection based on the lack of an enumerated power. But on
closer look, the separation of powers objection is just another way of asserting
that Congress cannot protect religious freedom through a general standard, and
thus the assertion is equally meritless.
An answer to the separation of powers challenge begins with the basic
distinction between legislative and constitutional rules. RFRA as applied to
federal law, and any other religious freedom legislation, does not change the
legal standard for constitutional claims; Smith continues to govern such claims.
The legislative history of RFRA makes clear what Congress thought it was
doing: it "d[id] not purport to legislate the standard of review to be applied by
the federal courts in cases brought under" the Free Exercise Clause, but instead
"create[d] a new statutory prohibition on governmental action that substantially
burdens the free exercise of religion.
98
To say that Congress merely creates a statutory right where the Court has
declined to find a constitutional right is not just a technical distinction. What
gives a rule constitutional status is that it cannot be overturned by ordinary
legislation, but only by an Article V amendment (or by a decision of the Court
overruling its own previous interpretation). Religious freedom legislation, by
contrast, can be repealed or modified at any time by ordinary legislation, and
a future federal law can exclude the Act's application if it does so explicitly.
challenge). The weakness of the facial challenge to RFRA is especially clear in light of the
Court's principle that a statute is facially valid unless "no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
98. S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 14 n.43. Accord Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th
Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1907); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. Of America, 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Before Boerne, Congress had already considered repealing the original RFRA
as it applied to prisons." Congress cannot, and did not try to in RFRA,
"repeal" Smith. It is not a happy result that particular religious claims can be
excluded from a religious freedom statute by simple legislation. But this result
follows from the fact that the protections are statutory in nature.
This basic point ought to suffice to refute the separation of powers
objection. But RFRA's opponents have claimed that the distinction between
statutory and constitutional rights is illusory in this context-a mere matter of
"formalities"' 0---so we need to examine the matter further.
It cannot be that Congress "usurps" judicial authority just because it
legislates a legal rule that the Court has declined to adopt under the Constitu-
tion. If so, any statutory provision that accommodates religion beyond what
the Free Exercise Clause requires would be unconstitutional. But as already
noted,'0 ' the Court has repeatedly upheld exemptions in federal laws even when
the exemptions were not constitutionally compelled. Indeed, Smith, the very
decision that Congress is said to be infringing upon, invited legislatures to
exempt religion from generally applicable laws.10 2 By accepting that invitation,
Congress surely did not conflict with the Smith ruling.
Of course, it is not only in the free exercise area that Congress has
legislated to protect a right after the courts have held it is not protected by the
Constitution. After Zurcher v. Stanford Daily0 3 held that the Fourth Amend-
ment gave no special protection to newspapers or other publications against
police searches of their offices, Congress enacted those very protections by
statute in the Privacy Protection Act of 1980."04 After Geduldig v. Aiello '5
held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause, Congress enacted a rule that pregnancy
discrimination was sex discrimination for statutory purposes ° -applying the
rule not only to private businesses, but to the states, who otherwise would have
been free from such a rule because of the Court's interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
In each of these cases, Congress enacted a legal rule protecting certain
rights as a matter of statute after the Court had interpreted the Constitution not
to require that rule and not to protect those rights. And there are numerous
other instances in which Congress has disagreed with the Court's constitutional
99. See 141 CONG. REc. 510, 895 (daily ed. July 28, 1995).
100. See Gressman & Carmella, supra note 13, at 96.
101. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
102. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
103. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994).
105. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
106. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
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decisions and "corrected" them in this way, or could do so.10 7 In short, it is
common, and entirely appropriate, for Congress to participate along with the
courts in the task of protecting rights and liberties, and to step in and legislate
where the courts have declined to find constitutional rights. Such a process
should not be looked upon as anything strange or suspicious. As the Eighth
Circuit just summarized in upholding RFRA's federal applications: "Congress
need not agree with everything the Supreme Court does in order for its
legislation to pass constitutional muster, [so] RFRA is not contrary to the
Constitution merely because Congress disargeed with the Smith Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause."'08
Of course, Congress cannot legislate a rule that itself violates a constitu-
tional standard enunciated by the courts; a statute cannot fall below the floor
of constitutional protection. That is the teaching of Marbury v. Madison and
of Cooper v. Aaron;'°9 and it is in that sense that the Supreme Court is
"supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."' 10 But statutes like
RFRA do not fall below the minimum of constitutional protection; they rise
above what the Court has said is constitutionally required. Going further than
what the Court says is required creates no conflict with the judicial rule,
because the Court has not ordered the legislature to go no further.
Again, the challengers to RFRA must concede that Congress can disagree
with the Court's ruling and protect rights more vigorously without infringing
on the judicial power."' Again, as with the "enumerated powers" argument,
they must complain that RFRA is invalid because the standard Congress
legislated is general rather than specific in nature and applies across the board
rather than only to a specific category or categories of religious claims. Thus,
Professors Gressman and Carmella argue that RFRA is "brief and general;" it
"does not set out to protect any specific religious exercise" but merely sets a
standard for deciding all cases where religion is substantially burdened; it
therefore amounts to "no more than an instruction on the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause."' 12  RFRA cannot be enacting a statutory right, they
assert-because, they implicitly assume, statutory rights cannot be in the form
of general standards. Thus, they argue that Congress can create a "substantive
right" only by determining that government possesses no reason good enough
to enforce [a particular] law against religious conduct."" 3 But RFRA creates
107. See Laycock, supra note 59, at 156 (giving other examples).
108. Christians, 1998 WL 166642.
109. 358 U.S. I (1958).
110. Id. at 18.
111. See Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 95-96; see also Hamilton, Fox and
Henhouse, supra note 13, at 363.
112. Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 115.
113. Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 107.
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only an "'across the board right to argue for religious exemptions'; it "makes
no claim that particular government action should not interfere with religious
exercise;" therefore it creates no statutory rights."1 4 The opponents assume that
a statutory right must take the form of a precise determination rather than a
general standard of evaluation.
In other words, the separation of powers argument rests on the same
proposition as the enumerated powers argument: Congress can protect
religious freedom beyond what the Court would do, but only by specific
determinations tied to specific categories of cases. Once again, the argument
is that general legislation is inappropriate, now because it interferes with the
courts' exclusive power to promulgate general, across-the-board standards for
protecting constitutional rights. And once again, this distinction between
general and specific statutes is meritless, for many of the reasons already
discussed.
First, there is no reason why a general standard previously used by the
courts in constitutional cases cannot be adopted as a statutory right. The
statutory right is to have the general standard applied to one's case. No
statutory provision is perfectly precise; all involve some level of generality.
That the courts previously used a given standard (and then rejected it) hardly
means that the standard does not amount to an independent statutory right.
Congress simply thinks that the standard is the best one; the courts' giving it
up themselves does not mean that others are barred from using it. Several state
courts have rejected the Smith rule under their own constitutions and have
applied the compelling interest analysis. Under the premises of RFRA's critics,
these state courts are not creating their own distinct state constitutional right,
but are unconstitutionally trying to interpret the federal Constitution in a way
different from the Supreme Court. But surely that conclusion cannot be
correct.1 5
Second, if a general statute may "intrude on" the judicial function of
interpreting the Constitution, a specific statute may do so as well. Every time
114. Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 107-08 (quoting Douglas Laycock, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 221, 230); see also Gressman and
Carmella, supra note 13, at 130 (arguing that "RFRA does not aim to restore any substantive
right of free exercise," but rather to instruct to follow a standard balancing burdens on religion
against the purposes of generally applicable laws).
Gressman and Carmella also point out places in the legislative history where RFRA's
proponents said that the statute ."creates no new rights' and "'does not create a new legal
standard."' Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 106-07 (quoting Senator Kennedy and
Senator Lieberman). In context, these quotes surely mean not that the statute created no
statutory right, but rather that the one it created was a familiar standard applied by the Supreme
Court before Smith.
115. Professor Eugene Volokh should be credited for this hypothetical, although he should
not necessarily be charged with agreeing with anything else I have written here.
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Congress legislates a rule that the courts had declined to adopt, it reweighs the
factors that the courts considered and rejects their judgment. The Privacy
Protection Act decided, contrary to Zurcher, that the free press interests
outweighed the state's need to gather evidence. The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act decided, contrary to Geduldig, that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is discrimination against women. The function of constitutional
interpretation includes fashioning holdings for particular situations as well as
setting out more general standards. As Judge Higginbotham put it for the Fifth
Circuit in Boerne, "[i]n either situation, Congress has 'disagreed' with the
judiciary regarding the scope of religious freedom;" but in neither situation has
it assumed power to declare a constitutional rule."'
Third, the separation of powers objection rests on a false premise: that by
nature legislative authority is more properly directed at relatively narrow
categories of cases, while only judicial authority is properly directed to
developing broad standards to cover a wide range of cases. In fact, as was
argued above," 7 the situation is often exactly the opposite: Congress legislates
broad standards applicable to a wide range of cases, leaving the courts to apply
those standards by developing more refined rules for particular categories. The
Sherman Anti-Trust Act broadly makes illegal any "contract, combination..
• or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce." ' 18  Faced with the
application of that general language to a variety of business practices with very
different effects on competition, federal courts have fashioned specific
categories of analysis for different practices, in common law fashion: some
activities are "per se" illegal, most others are subject to "reasonableness"
analysis.' The antitrust statute has never been thought inappropriate just
because Congress gave only general guidance and put the courts in the role of
implementing it.
Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted general standards of
nondiscrimination covering many forms of discrimination, and applying to a
vast range of situations: public accommodations, federally funded activities,
employment relationships. Courts were inevitably left to develop tests and
presumptions for particular categories of cases, such as general employment
116. Boerne, 73 F.3d at 1363.
117. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 &2.
119. Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (condemning
horizontal price fixing as per se anticompetitive); with State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275
(1997) (overruling other precedents and holding that vertical maximum price fixing is not per
se anticompetitive). In the Sherman Act, "Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the
statute's broad meaning by drawing on common-law tradition."' Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284
(citation omitted).
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practices with a discriminatory impact on protected groups," or individual
actions that might be motivated by discrimination but might also be based on
a legitimate reason.' 2' Again, there is nothing exceptional about Congress
legislating in general rather than specific terms. There has never been any
suggestion that because the antitrust or civil rights statutes set overarching
standards rather than precise rules, they therefore created no real statutory
rights.
The Civil Rights Act itself enacted a legal standard that the Court had
refused to authorize under the Constitution. The Reconstruction-era law
prohibiting discrimination in accommodations was struck down in the Civil
Rights Cases122 on the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
authorize Congress to reach beyond the actions of the state. In 1964 Congress
enacted a prohibition on discrimination by private actors, with a basic standard
so wide-ranging--reaching discrimination based on race, sex, ethnicity, or
religion, and covering discrimination in accommodations, employment, and
federally-funded activities---that it exhausts a large part of what the Equal
Protection Clause would require of private entities if it applied to them. But
Congress acted based on the Commerce Power, of course, because the
Fourteenth Amendment avenue had been foreclosed by the Court.
The new prohibition on discrimination displaced the Civil Rights Cases'
holding concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, and made it irrelevant, in a
vast range of cases involving discrimination by private actors. Did it therefore
violate the separation of powers? There is no principled basis for saying that
applying RFRA to federal law displaces the free exercise rule of Smith to a
greater extent than applying the 1964 Civil Rights Act to private business
displaced the state action rule of the Civil Rights Cases. In practice the anti-
discrimination laws may involve just a wide a range of circumstances as does
RFRA, and I am confident that there is no principled line to draw between
statutes that reach a sufficiently narrow range of circumstances and those that
cut too broadly.
Consider other possible statutes adopting a standard that the Court had
declined to adopt under the Constitution. Suppose, for example, that after the
Court held that the federal government was not constitutionally required to
accommodate religious objections to its own "internal operations, ' 23 Congress
120. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (adopting the "business
necessity" test for such practices).
121. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (adopting presumptions
and order of proof for such cases).
122. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
123. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439,448 (1988);
see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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passed a statute saying that such objections should in fact trigger heightened
scrutiny. Such a statute would set a general standard for a significant number
of, though not all, religious freedom exercise cases. Would it go too far in
interfering with the courts' authority to set standards for religious freedom
cases? It cannot be distinguished in principle from RFRA's general standard. 24
A distinct separation of powers objection is that RFRA's standard,
weighing substantial burdens against governments, is judicially unmanageable
and therefore nonjusticiable, at least in federal courts, under the "case or
controversy" doctrines of Article rn.1 25 The proponents of this view rely
heavily on the statements in Smith that courts cannot identify which religious
claims are "central" to the believer's faith, and that it is not appropriate for
judges to "weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs."' 26 Smith certainly advanced these concerns as one reason not
to adopt a constitutional standard recognizing accommodations. But it is
another thing to say that these concerns mean that Congress cannot adopt the
standard as a statutory right-in other words, that the standard is affirmatively
unconstitutional. Concerns for administrability may be one important factor
in the courts' choice between constitutional rules, but it hardly follows that
such concerns authorize the courts to refuse to follow or enforce a statute
enacted by Congress.
In any event, if the compelling interest standard is nonjusticiable, then it
is not clear why the standard could ever be used by federal courts. But Smith
retained the standard for cases involving discrimination against religion, or
hybrid claims of free exercise combined with some other constitutional right,
or cases where the nature of the government action is one of "individualized
124. Cf Mistretta, 448 U.S. at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting on other grounds) (conceding
that the line between statutes that are sufficiently specific or too general is not "readily
enforceable by the courts," since "no statute can be entirely precise," and thus should be left to
Congress's better sense "of the 'necessities' of government").
Critics of RFRA suggest that the statute uniquely intrudes on the judicial power because
its scope covers not just some category of free exercise cases, but all of them. See, e.g.,
Gressman and Carmella, supra note 13, at 115 (RFRA "intends to protect all religious exercise
that is burdened by an insufficiently important governmental interest" and is therefore "no more
than instruction on the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause"). But of course RFRA does not
displace the Court's judgment in all religious freedom cases. The Court already applies the
compelling interest test when the burden on religion is discriminatory. See Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). And when the burden imposed on religion
is not "substantial," RFRA agrees with the Court that the compelling interest test should not
apply. Thus RFRA, as applied to federal laws, is conceptually indistinguishable from the
hypothetical "internal operations" statute in text.
125. See Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5 (1995).
126. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887, 890.
[Vol. 20
FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
consideration."'' 7 In those situations, the Court will still have to determine
whether the burden on religion is substantial-for example, whether there is a
substantial burden from restrictions that fall short of prohibiting activity
commanded by a religious tenet. 28 And it will have to decide what kinds of
government interests are sufficiently compelling to justify such burdens. Smith
is better read as an instance of judicial restraint in interpreting the Constitution
than as a holding that the compelling interest standard is affirmatively
unconstitutional.
The reductio ad absurdum of the various separation of powers objections
is the argument by one district court that RFRA "deprives the courts of the
opportunity to evaluate [government] action under the First Amendment.' 29
Judicial review exists not so that courts can have a chance to interpret
constitutional provisions, but so that the people can be protected against
intrusive or arbitrary government action. If the legislature takes up the cause
of protecting these rights, so that the courts have no need to render
constitutional interpretations, that is cause for celebration, not disapproval.
30
Suppose Congress, concerned about some possible or actual abuses, passed a
statute saying that American troops would never be quartered in any private
house, not even with the owner's supposed consent and not even in time of
war? By so legislating, Congress would avoid ever violating the Third
Amendment--indeed it would protect citizens from quartering troops even in
situations where the Amendment would allow it.13' The Court would never
have a chance to determine, for example, what would constitute "consent" of
the owner, within the meaning of the Third Amendment, to quartering of troops
in her house. Yet the statute would be a victory for civil liberties, not a defeat.
It is true that Boerne contains a few brief statements that RFRA
contradicts separation of powers principles and that constitutional decisions
like Smith must be treated with "respect."' 3 2 But there is no need to read those
127. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see Paulsen, supra note 64, at 253 n.1 1.
128. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 391-92; see also Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
129. Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591, 600 (D. Md.
1996). See also Gressman and Cannella, supra note 13, at 139 (RFRA "hobble[s] the Supreme
Court's ability to be an independent arbiter of the meaning and application of a constitutional
provision").
130. To disapprove of the actual protection of rights because the Court loses a chance to
investigate constitutional meaning smacks of Robert Bork's disastrous answer to the question
why he wanted to be on the Court: not to protect rights or do justice, but simply to enjoy an
"intellectual feast." See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA 275-76 (1989).
131. The amendment provides that "[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed
by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
132. SeeBoerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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few references as working a devastating cutback in Congress's discretion as to
how to legislate to control its own laws and the federal agencies that enforce
them. Boerne's references to the judicial power make sense in the context of
the overwhelming subject of the opinion: the scope of the Section 5 power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Except for these few ambiguous
references at the very end, the Boerne opinion deals only with Section 5, its
historical background, and the case law interpreting it.133 There is not a single
reference to the general history of separation of powers, or to leading decisions
on the judicial power such as United States v. KleinI" or Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farms "35-matters that one would expect to see discussed if the Court had
intended to say anything about separation of powers generally, outside the
Section 5 context.
To reiterate, the separation of powers is relevant to Section 5 because that
grant of power is explicitly restricted to enforcing constitutional rights and
therefore implicates the Court's power to declare the legally operative
boundaries of those constitutional rights. Somebody, either the Court or
Congress, had to declare what those boundaries were. If Congress had the
authority to define the boundaries, the Court said, then the grant of power to
Congress to impose restrictions on the states would be effectively
unlimited' 36-- since there is no other restriction on the Section 5 power other
than that Congress must be enforcing constitutional rights.
By contrast, again, the Article I powers do not depend on Congress
enforcing the Constitution. They are limited by other concepts--regulating
interstate commerce, or making bankruptcy laws, or spending for the general
welfare-and the Court clearly has the authority to interpret all of those
concepts to police Congress's power. And allowing Congress to restrain its
own laws helps to limit rather than expand Congress's power.
Boerne said that within its own sphere, Congress has the right and duty
to interpret the Constitution as it sees best. Elsewhere the Court has said that
"[s]eparation-of-powers principles are vindicated, not disserved, by measured
cooperation between the two political branches ... each contributing to a
lawful objective through its own processes."'37 Surely, securing religious
liberty is a lawful objective, and for Congress to give extra protection to
religious freedom from its own laws is an example of how all branches can
cooperate in securing liberty. It would be a serious intrusion on the legislative
133. See id. at 2164-66 (discussing historical background of Section 5); see also id. at
2166-71 (discussing case law interpreting it).
134. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
135. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
136. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164, 2168.
137. Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996).
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branch if the judicial branch were to rule that Congress may protect religious
freedom in discrete statutes, but that it is without discretion to do so generally.
III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO RESTRAIN STATE AND LOCAL LAWS: THE
PROSPECTS FOR NEW RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LEGISLATION
To protect religious freedom from state and local laws after Boerne,
Congress will have to legislate anew. This part considers the validity of such
new legislation under various enumerated powers: the Section 5 power, the
Spending Power, and Commerce Power. Legislation to protect religious
freedom from state laws, as opposed to federal, raises additional questions
because it implicates the concerns for federalism and state autonomy that the
Court expressed in Boerne. In placing limits on federal power in matters of
state concern, Boerne joined a number of other recent decisions.138 How far the
Court will carry its emphasis on federalism is unclear; but plainly any new
congressional legislation will have to be carefully drafted.
On the other hand, new legislation applied to state laws would have the
advantage of relying very clearly on a set of defined enumerated powers-over
federal spending, interstate commerce, and Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment. Opponents could not claim (as they have with federal applications of
RFRA) that no particular enumerated power or powers are clearly identified or
implicated. Moreover, that Boerne struck down RFRA as an exercise of the
Section 5 power does not mean that general religious freedom legislation
cannot be enacted under these other powers if it falls within their boundaries.
If Congress can enact a rule under one of its powers, it does not matter that it
cannot do so under others. Again, the Civil Rights Act teaches the lesson:
while Congress could not reach discrimination by private actors under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it could enact a similar nondiscrimination rule by use
of the Commerce Power.
39
Moreover, new religious freedom legislation under these discrete powers
would not infringe on the judicial power, even under the theories of RFRA's
opponents discussed in the previous part.' 40 Any component of legislation
under the Section 5 power must now conform generally to the Smith rule and
may not go far beyond it, so it cannot be infringing on the courts. That leaves
legislation under the Spending and Commerce powers. Even if Congress
enacts a form of heightened scrutiny under each of these powers, that would
138. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
139. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
140. See supra Part II.
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not be the same as enacting the standard for all claims of religious exercise
across the board. The rule would be tied to defined powers and would not
displace the Smith rule in all cases. Even those who object to RFRA on
separation of powers grounds have conceded that Congress can go beyond the
Court's standard for protecting rights, if it does so pursuant to defined powers
in defined situations and does not simply displace the Court's standard in all
free exercise cases.
The question with state legislation, rather, is whether the particular
enumerated powers will support religious freedom legislation, or how far they
will support it. Given the Court's concern with federalism, it is necessary to
legislate carefully here. But if Congress acts carefully, it may be able to offer
considerable protection beyond what Smith offers.
A. Section 5 Power to Enforce Smith's Interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause
After Boerne, Congress can still use its Section 5 power to remedy and
prevent violations of the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith: that is,
to prevent the restriction of religious practice by laws that are not generally
applicable. Most importantly, Boerne did not overrule the Court's statement
in Katzenbach v. Morganl"" that in using the Section 5 power, Congress is not
limited "to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.' 42 If Congress can
identify a step that is appropriate for preventing or deterring the restriction of
religion by discriminatory or non-general laws-in the words of Boerne, if a
step is "proportional [to]" and "adapted to" enforcing the rule of Smith 43---then
it will fit within the power to enforce the Constitution, even if the Court might
not declare such a rule itself in any particular case.
RFRA's proponents tried to argue in Boerne that applying the compelling
interest test across the board was a means of ensuring against discrimination.
The Court rejected that claim, saying that RFRA's test went far beyond
anything necessary to prevent discrimination. Nevertheless, in many cases
facially or ostensibly neutral and general laws can be the means for discrimina-
tion against religion or particular religious practices. One situation where there
is evidence of this is in land-use cases, where churches are subject to landmark
141. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
142. Id. at 649.
143. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
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laws at a much higher rate than other entities" and where there is documented
evidence of general laws being applied in discriminatory fashion.'45
Another common situation is that of jury trials in tort cases where the jury
is asked to apply an open-ended standard of "reasonableness" to religiously
motivated behavior. One example is in cases where Jehovah's Witnesses and
other religious adherents have been tortiously injured but have refused
transfusions or other medical treatments that might have prevented further
physical injuries. In such lawsuits, juries have been asked to decide whether
the plaintiffs decision constituted an "unreasonable" failure to mitigate
damages, under the "avoidable consequences" rule of tort law. In one such
case, Munn v. Algee,'46 counsel for the defendant insurance company was
allowed to inquire into the so-called reasonableness of the victim's Jehovah's
Witness beliefs that a blood transfusion would damn her soul. The defendant
did so by, among other things, eliciting testimony that Witnesses refuse to
salute the flag or serve in the military and that they regard the United States as
Antichrist. 147 The jury ultimately awarded only $10,000 for an injury that
caused the victim several hours of pain and ultimately killed her. The court of
appeals affirmed on the ground that the avoidable consequences rule was
"neutral and generally applicable" under Smith. 1
48
Another example of discrimination infecting purportedly neutral standards
is in the area of tort claims against new religious groups. George v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness149 serves as an example. A teenage
girl ran away from home to join the Hare Krishna sect, an offshoot of
traditional Hinduism, and over the next few months was, at times, concealed
by the group from her parents. After her return to her parents, she and her
mother sued the group for a variety of torts, including false imprisonment,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Some members of the
group had indeed committed acts of fraud by concealing the girl, but much of
the plaintiffs' evidence consisted of attacks on the unusual and ascetic practices
of the Hare Krishnas, such as vegetarianism, fasting, and foregoing sleep.
144. See, e.g., N.J. L'Heureux, Ministry v. Mortar: A Landmark Conflict, in GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 164, 168 (Dean Kelley ed. 1986) (churches are 42 times
more likely than other buildings to be designated as landmarks in New York City).
145. See, e.g., Brief of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 95-2074) (on file with author) (showing disproportionate
number of zoning conflicts involving unfamiliar and minority religions).
146. 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 900 (1991). The author served as co-
counsel on the petition for certiorari.
147. See id. at 571; id. at 580-82 (Rubin, J. dissenting).
148. See id.
149. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1989), depublished by order of California Supreme Court, stay




After hearing extensive evidence about the supposed "pernicious evil" of the
Krishna sect, the jury awarded the plaintiffs more than $32.5 million, based on
findings that the Krishnas' conduct had been "outrageous" and that the girl had
been "imprisoned" without her consent. 50 And again, the appellate court
affirmed liability on the "outrageousness" count (reducing but not eliminating
the punitive award) on the ground that the jury might have reached the verdict
without being influenced by the prejudicial material.
George was typical of a number of large tort awards against religious
bodies in the 1980s. Most if not all of these suits involved claims not of
physical violence, but of tortious communications---misrepresentation,
infliction of emotional distress--that were intertwined with the defendants'
religious beliefs in ways never clearly separated at trial. In most of these cases,
the unpopular beliefs of the religion were made a central issue, and the awards
were primarily for emotional distress and punitive damages, not for any
physical injuries. Both the standards for such damages and the standards for
liability ("outrageousness" or "imprisonment," for example) are general in form
but are highly subjective in practice, and they gave the jury great room to vent
its reaction to the unflattering testimony it had heard. Appellate courts failed
to correct many of the errors.
In cases such as Munn and George, a decisionmaker takes action under a
standard that is ostensibly neutral but in fact allows great scope for discrimina-
tion against particular religious claims. The decisionmaker in those cases was
a jury, but similar discretionary decisions are made every day by school
officials, zoning board members, and other government actors. And as in
Munn and George, courts are often willing to disregard evidence of discrimina-
tion because the standard applied is ostensibly neutral. The courts say that the
plaintiff has not proven discrimination.
I dwell on the jury verdicts in tort cases because they provide a record of
religious prejudice tainting a proceeding (even though appellate courts fail to
remove the taint). But similar problems are present, though perhaps less
apparent, in any situation in which a decisionmaker-judge, juror, or
administrator-has to apply an open-ended, subjective standard such as
''reasonableness" or "good cause." Such determinations are present in many
situations of decisionmaking about religious claims.
Congress can legitimately take account of the difficulties in proving
discrimination, and can take steps to remedy it. Congress can also take account
of how deterrence of state discrimination is weakened by immunity doctrines
150. See id. at 221. Even after the damages were reduced by remittitur and the appeals
court threw out the false imprisonment count, the verdict was more than $3 million, enough
virtually to bankrupt the Krishna religion in the United States.
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and by the general disparity of resources between government bodies and
religious citizens. A common remedial device is to shift the burden of proof;
once the religious believer has articulated some substantial evidence of
wrongful behavior (in this case, intentional discrimination), the opponent
would have the burden to show that the law being applied is not discriminatory.
Such burden shifting rules are common in the text or interpretation of civil
rights laws.' Precisely how the burdens should be allocated can be a difficult
question. The only point here is that legislation shifting the burden in these
ways would be a legitimate measure under Section 5, "proportional" and
"adapted" to the goal of enforcing the non-discrimination rule in the light of
difficulties in proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
Another permissible means of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause as
interpreted in Smith might be to legislate the compelling interest test explicitly
in those cases involving "hybrid" rights: where a free exercise interest is
combined with a serious claim under some other constitutional right, such as
freedom of speech or association, the right of parental control over education,
or rights of private property. Smith stated that such hybrid claims should still
trigger strict scrutiny.'52 There is some question as to how seriously the Court
takes this category; Justice Scalia may have thrown it into the Smith opinion
simply to avoid overruling previous decisions like Wisconsin v. Yoder.' But
for that very reason, it may be useful for Congress to enshrine the category in
a statute. It might be suggested that protecting hybrid rights referred to in
Smith will accomplish nothing, because it will either duplicate what the Court
would protect or will go beyond the Court's substantive constitutional standard
and therefore exceed Congress's power under Boerne.54 But legislating this
category could have an effect by calling the Court's bluff. If courts are inclined
to read the "hybrid rights" language of Smith narrowly, an explicit statutory
enactment of this category might head off that inclination. And if the statutory
provision tracked Smith's language reasonable closely, it would be impossible
for the Court to strike it down without considerable embarrassment.
151. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (shifting burden of proof of business necessity to
defendant in employment discrimination case once plaintiff has shown disparate impact);
McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 (shifting burden of production to defendant in
disparate treatment case once plaintiff has made prima facie case of employment
discrimination); I RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 3.08[3][a], at 3.56-2
(3d ed. 1994) (noting similar structures of proof under for housing discrimination claims); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(3), 2000e-5(g) (once employment discrimination plaintiff shows an
impermissible motivating factor, burden shifts to defendant to prove it would have taken same
action anyway); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977)
(similar burden shift in constitutional cases).
152. See 494 U.S. at 881-82.
153. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
154. See Conkle, supra note 13, at pt. II.
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B. Spending Power Conditions on Federal Funding
As another component of religious liberty legislation, Congress could
require states and local governments to refrain from applying burdensome
general laws, as a condition of receiving federal funds. The relevant source of
authority is the Article I power to tax and spend for the general welfare.'55
Unlike the Section 5 power, this ground for legislation would allow Congress
to enact a rule of behavior for state action--the compelling interest test or some
other form of heightened scrutiny--that is not required by the Constitution.
But also unlike the Section 5 or Commerce Power rationales, Congress would
be affecting state laws only indirectly, as a condition on the receipt of federal
money.
To be more specific, Congress might provide that no state or local
government program or activity that receives federal funds may impose
substantial burdens on the religious exercise of those participating in its
program unless the burden is justified by a compelling or overriding purpose.
The U.S. Code is replete with statutes conditioning the receipt of federal funds
on the recipient's acting or not acting in certain ways. The model for such a
provision would be the various anti-discrimination laws, which prohibit
discrimination based on race, sex, handicap, or age in any program or activity
receiving federal assistance (which as applied to state governments means any
state agency receiving such assistance). 56  These conditions, including
provisions for private lawsuits to enforce them, were upheld as exercises of the
Spending Power in Lau v. Nichols. 1
7
The existing case law gives Congress great leeway in putting conditions
on federal funds to state and local governments. It is more favorable to
congressional power than the Section 5 case law was before Boerne. The last
decision to strike down such a condition came before the New Deal "revolu-
tion" of 1937; and even that decision, United States v. Butler, said Congress
can exercise the Spending Power to set, as conditions, rules that could not be
directly imposed under the other enumerated powers.158 Ten years ago, South
Dakota v. Dole'59 held that even if Congress could not legislate a 21-year
minimum drinking age itself, it could require states to do so as a condition of
receiving federal highway funds. Therefore, even if the Section 5 power does
155. See U.S. CO ST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
156. See Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (race); Title IX, Education
Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. § 1681 (sex); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (handicap); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975, Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 6102
(age).
157. 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974).
158. See297U.S. 1, 16(1936).
159. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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not authorize Congress to directly require states to leave religious practice free
from general laws, the Spending Power can authorize Congress to set that rule
as a condition on funding. Dole was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and'
joined by Justice Scalia; thus, two of the leaders of the states' rights wing of the
Court are on record as favoring relatively broad congressional discretion to set
conditions on funding.
There are some limits on the Spending Power; and it is possible that some
members of the Court are priming to limit the power more, extending the
federalism emphasis already evident in the commerce and Section 5 decisions.
The majority opinion in Dole required that the condition on funding be
germane to the purpose of the expenditure--but only in the sense that there was
some rational connection.' 60 That was satisfied in Dole because teenage
drinking bears some relation to highway safety. 161
Justice O'Connor, who dissented in Dole, would require something more.
In her view, the condition must actually restrict the use of the federal funds,
rather than place some separate constraint on the state's behavior--even if the
separate constraint bears some connection to the purpose of the expenditure.
Thus in Dole, O'Connor said that the condition of a 2 1-year minimum drinking
age was a separate constraint that, although it bore some relation to highway
safety, was more than a restriction on the use of the highway funds.' 62
If new religious freedom legislation based on the Spending Power is
carefully drafted, however, should survive not only under the governing
germaneness test of Dole, but also under O'Connor's tougher approach. Under
the first, Congress can quite rationally find that when subsidized state programs
infringe on religious conscience, the objecting believer is likely to be prevented
from participating in or obtaining the benefits of the program. And to that
extent, the purposes of the program are frustrated.
Public schools provide just one example. Surely one of the most common
reasons why parents send their children to private schools, or home school
them, is that the parents have religiously based objections to the curriculum or
other elements in the schools. The objection may be to a series of textbooks, 63
160. See id. at 207.
161. Seeid.at208.
162. See id. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (claiming
that exposing children to objectionable textbooks violated their free exercise rights); Smith v.




an explicit sex-education program, 6 or a condom distribution policy.65 If the
schools refuse to make any accommodations for religious conscience in such
situations, and cannot be legally prodded to do so, a significant number of
parents and children may feel themselves unable to use the public schools. The
federal government gives assistance to public school districts in order to help
them provide a better education, but this federal purpose is frustrated to the
extent that families stay away from the public schools. Not all parental
objections to public school activities involve serious burdens on religion, and
not all can be accommodated by the school. But the compelling interest test or
some other kind of heightened scrutiny, while allowing the school to show that
it cannot make an accommodation, requires that the showing be a strong one.
A carefully-drafted religious liberty statute based on the Spending Power
would also satisfy Justice O'Connor's stricter demand that any restrictions be
on the use of the funds rather than on some independent matter. Again, the
anti-discrimination laws provide the logical model. Congress can ensure that
"public funds . . . [will] not be spent in any fashion which encourages,
entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination";' 66 to that end, it
forbids discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal funds. In
the same way, Congress can ensure that federal funds going to a particular
group or activity will not be used to support the imposition of unnecessary
burdens on religious freedom. The condition is in fact a restriction on the use
of funds, as Justice O'Connor demands. Even scholars who want to limit the
Spending Power defend the anti-discrimination conditions on the ground that
Congress can legitimately decide to purchase only nondiscriminatory
education. 167 Similarly, Congress could decide only to purchase state and local
government services that do not burden religious freedom. The justices are
unlikely to want to do away with a central component of civil rights enforce-
ment.
Under this approach, a new religious liberty law would be much more
defensible than the drinking age condition upheld in Dole. Congress there
pressured each state as a whole, not just the agency being funded. And it
pressured it to legislate on an independent question of social policy (teenage
164. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995)
(rejecting First Amendment and parental rights challenge to such a program at school
assembly).
165. See, e.g., Curtis v. School Committee, 420 Mass. 749, 652 N.E.2d (1995) (rejecting
challenges to policy of making condoms available without notice to parents).
166. Lau, 414 U.S. at 569 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6543 (Sen. Humphrey's statement on
Title VI)).
167. See Thomas R. McCoy and Barry Friedman, Conditional Federal Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 85, 114 (1988).
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drinking) that, while it certainly had a connection to the federal expenditure
(highway construction), also had a host of other implications.
Nevertheless, as Professor Dan Conkle suggests, the Court could find
ways to limit the Spending Power, and a religious freedom law based on it,
incrementally rather than radically. One possibility would be a holding that the
language imposing conditions on any "program or activity" receiving funds is
too broad if it goes beyond covering the particular state program receiving
funds and extends coverage to all of the activities of the state agency that
administers that funded program. 168 The agency-wide definition-a whole
agency is covered if it receives funds in any of its programs-is the general
standard for civil rights funding conditions, under the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1988.169 If the Court were to hold this coverage to be too broad, it
would probably reason that covering an entire agency goes beyond controlling
the use of funds in the particular program and imposes a "coercive" effect on
other activities of the state.
Of course, the agency-wide condition is far less expansive than telling the
state how to legislate if it wants a particular grant--and Dole upheld such a
condition placed on the state. Striking down the agency-wide condition would,
therefore, be a relatively major step, invalidating the standard found in most
civil rights laws. The Supreme Court has been willing to strike down federal
laws to protect states' rights; but as already noted, some of the leading justices
in that movement seem to be more hospitable to Congress's affecting the states
indirectly through funding conditions. The safest form of Spending Power
legislation would extend the funding condition (no burdens on religious
freedom) only to the program receiving funds. But the broader, agency-wide
condition is well supported by precedents, if the Court decides to adhere to
them. 1
70
168. See Conkle, supra note 13, at pt. II.
169. Pub. L. No. 100-259 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §1687) (concerning sex discrimination,
and in other provisions concerning racial, handicap, and age discrimination).
170. Advocates of the autonomy of religious institutions (indeed, of private institutions
generally) may have reason to be wary of arguing for broad coverage of state agencies under
the Spending Power. If the federal government can impose conditions broadly on states based
on the funding of one state program, then federal or state governments may also be able to
impose conditions on religious schools or other religious institutions based on the funding of
one aspect of the institution's operations. For example, the Civil Rights Restoration Act
requires nondiscrimination in all programs of an institution is the institution receives assistance
in one area (including, for a school, loans or grants to students). In approving the "abortion gag
rule" in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court did say that government aid to one
project of an organization did not entitle the government to restrict the organization's speech
in all other activities; but the majority allowed the speech restrictions to extend fairly far to any
activity not kept clearly distinct from the subsidized project. And further, many of the Court
decisions invalidating forms of financial assistance to religious schools rest on the proposition
that aid to one aspect of the schools is necessarily aid to all others, including the religious
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Professor Conkle also suggests the possibility that the Court might restrict
Congress's ability to authorize private suits by beneficiaries to enforce funding
conditions (as opposed to enforcement through a withdrawal of funds by the
administering federal agency). 7 ' Such a restriction would be troublesome for
religious freedom legislation, which would likely rely in part on private suits
by beneficiaries whose religious freedom was burdened by the subsidized state
program. It is unclear how the possibility of private suits to enforce a condition
is any more "coercive" on the state than the sanction of withdrawing federal
funds-indeed, it is probably less so.
Another argument against authorizing private suits is that a state's duty to
obey funding conditions is purely contractual---the result of its agreement with
the funding agency---and therefore all questions concerning that duty would
have to be decided under state law. This would include, so the argument goes,
the question of whether citizen beneficiaries could sue to enforce the condition.
The question would be determined by state law concerning third-party
beneficiaries and could not be controlled by any federal statutory provision
authorizing private suits.'72 It does not seem likely that the Court would adopt
this argument. Why Congress cannot legislate a private federal law cause of
action against state officials as a necessary and proper measure to enforce
conditions that are concededly within the Spending Power is not clear. In
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,'73 the Court indicated that
Congress's authority to create a private remedy to enforce funding conditions
did not depend on the existence of some Article I power other than the
Spending Power. 74 Even assuming that the state's duty is purely contractual,
citizen beneficiaries whose religion has been burdened should qualify as third-
aspects. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
For several reasons, allowing broad coverage of state agencies under the Spending Power
would not necessarily authorize the government to impose troublesome restrictions on religious
and other private institutions. Such institutions would have First Amendment rights--for
example, the free exercise right to hire employees from their own faith, or the free speech right
to engage in advocacy--that might well be enforced more vigorously than the states' rights at
issue in a religious liberty law. Even with the Court's recent federalism decisions, it has still
been more willing to enforce enumerated rights of private institutions vigorously than to place
severe limits on Congress's enumerated powers in the name of state's rights. Moreover, the
Spending Power theory would only support the government's discretion to put institution-wide
conditions on aid; it surely would not go so far as to require the elimination of religious
elements from institutions receiving aid (as the Court did in the Lemon line of cases).
Nevertheless, defenders of religious institutions' autonomy might wish to be careful about how
broad a Spending Power theory they endorse.
171. See Conkle, supra note 13, at pt. II.
172. See Conkle, supra note 13, at 678 n.245 (citing David Engdahl, The Spending Power,
44 DuKE L.J. 1, 96-97 (1994)).
173. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
174. See id. at 75 & n.8.
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party beneficiaries of the funding conditions, because the very point of such
conditions is to protect those beneficiaries' religious exercise. Congress could
express that intent in any legislation or grant and require agreement from the
state officials receiving the grant. Of course, Congress in its legislation should
make clear that private suits are authorized, and the grant documents should
also make the remedy clear.
175
C. Commerce Power
A final possible component of new religious liberty legislation would be
reliance on the power to regulate interstate commerce. Congress could decree
that religious practices that participate in or substantially affect interstate
commerce may not be substantially burdened without a compelling or
overriding governmental interest. Again, the best result under the commerce
power alone would provide only partial coverage, but the connection to
interstate commerce would serve as simply one among several triggers for
protection.
Religious activity and governmental regulation of it affect interstate
commerce because religious entities are themselves actors in commerce.
Churches, religious schools, religious social service agencies, and other
religious entities purchase materials and employ people in commerce, and to
a large degree: the total expenditure by religious institutions is no doubt in the
billions of dollars a year, and no doubt much of it is the purchase of goods and
services moving in interstate commerce. 176 Regulation of these entities'
activities affects how they engage in commerce. For example, when zoning
laws forbid a church from locating in an area, or landmarking laws require a
church to alter or give up its plans for expansion, the church's purchasing
decisions are affected, and often its activity in commerce is diminished. When
labor laws regulate a religious entity's employment practices-for example,
requiring a parochial school to accept unionization of its teachers, 77 or to pay
unemployment benefits to employees discharged for conduct the school regards
175. See generally Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1981).
176. While more detailed statistics are necessary to support such assertions, just one
indicator is that, according to a leading survey, charitable contributions to religious entities
nationwide in 1996 totaled $69.44 billion (a figure that appears even to leave out some
contributions to religiously affiliated education). See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-
RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA 1997 (summary available at http://www.aafrc.org). Since
religious organizations also receive considerable revenue from investments, quid-pro-quo
transactions, and government funding, it is easy to see that their yearly receipts, and thus likely
their expenditures too, are in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
177. See Catholic High School Assn. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding
application of state collective bargaining laws to religious school teachers).
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as sinfull---the entity's employment decisions are again affected. It may hire
fewer people, or in a different pattern, than if it were not regulated.
The proposition that religious entities affect commerce is the premise for
subjecting them to various federal regulatory statutes, including ERISA, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations kct, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, and others. It cannot be that religious entities are engaged in
commerce when Congress regulates them, but not when Congress decides to
exempt them from regulation. Of course, Congress needs to make appropriate
findings to support the connection of religious institutions to interstate
commerce.
Even if a religious entity in a particular case does not engage in sufficient
economic activity to affect interstate commerce, the aggregate of religious
entities' activities is sufficient to affect it. 179 In United States v. Lopez, 80 the
Court indicated that aggregating commercial effects in this way is generally
inappropriate when the underlying activity involved-in that case, mere
possession of a gun-is not in any way commercial. But the aggregation
argument appears to remain valid when there is a commercial component to the
activity; and as I have just argued, religious entities have such a commercial
element to their activities.' 8' The statute invalidated in Lopez also suffered
from the lack of any jurisdictional element tying the offense to interstate
commerce, and from the lack of any congressional findings making the
connection.'82 Obviously, in passing new religious freedom legislation
Congress would be well advised to make appropriate findings and to include
a jurisdictional element, for example, covering only religious activities that
"affect commerce."
Of course, to have to defend protection of a fundamental civil right such
as religious freedom on the basis of its effect on commerce is less than ideal;
some find it objectionable. But Congress used this method in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to reach the moral evil of discrimination. Now, as then, the fact
that Congress is addressing a civil or moral right does not mean it cannot rely
on the Commerce Power. Congress had no choice but to use the Commerce
Power in 1964 because the Court had ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment
could not support legislation against discrimination by private entities.'. 3
178. See, e.g., St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray, 557 A.2d 1214 (R.I. 1989) (requiring
school to pay benefits to teacher discharged for violating Church's rules on marriages).
179. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
180. 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
181. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (reaffirming Wickard, 317 U.S. 111 (aggregating activity
of crop-growing for home consumption)); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995)
(upholding Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, in part under an aggregation theory).
182. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
183. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Today Congress is in the same boat; it has to consider the Commerce Power
because of the Court's narrow interpretation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in Smith and Boerne.
I think that under the affecting-commerce rationale, a well-drafted statute
with the right findings and definitions could cover much of the activity of
religious organizations. And some of the more compelling cases for religious
accommodations involve organizational autonomy: the right of churches or
schools to determine who they will hire to carry out their missions, the right of
churches to alter their buildings for liturgical or missions purposes despite
landmarking laws, and so forth. If institutional autonomy were securely
protected by current First Amendment doctrine, perhaps protection under the
Commerce Power would be redundant; but the Court has been very sparing
recently in recognizing institutional autonomy claims.'
However, the commerce rationale will not apply so easily to individual
religious exercise, which often does not have any commercial element. Some
conflicts between individual free exercise and the laws arise out of individuals'
commercial activity, for example, the cases where landlords assert conscien-
tious objections to being forced by law to accept unmarried couples at
tenants.18 5 But some of the most compelling cases for protecting individual
religious conscience do not implicate commercial activity. That is the cost of
having to rely on a commercial provision to protect a fundamental civil right.
Many of these other impositions on religious freedom could be addressed by
legislation based on the Spending or Section 5 powers.
The affirmative argument that religious entities affect commerce certainly
falls well within the scope of past interpretations of commerce. But there are
also uncertainties in the Commerce Power argument, because the Court has
been reinstituting limits on that power rather vigorously. When Congress
imposes a rule under the Commerce Clause, it regulates directly, rather than
indirectly as through conditions on federal spending. And the commerce
rationale may be subject to limits based on state sovereignty-unlike the
Section 5 power, which is based on the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision
that specifically limits state sovereignty.
Two lines of argument might be advanced against a Commerce Power
component of religious freedom legislation, but they overlap quite substan-
tially, and they both can be answered by the same response. First, one might
argue, as Professor Conkle suggests in this symposium,8 6 that what religious
184. See, e.g., Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 392-97; Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of
Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985) (both rejecting claims that regulation unconstitutionally
entangled government with religious institutions).
185. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
186. See Conkle, supra note 13, at pt. III.
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freedom legislation regulates directly is not the economic activity of religious
organizations, but rather the non-economic activity of state and local lawmak-
ing. The effect of religious freedom legislation on the economic activity of
religious organizations is only indirect, through the effect it has on state laws
that burden such organizations. United States v. Lopez suggests that when the
activity being regulated is non-economic, Congress will at the least have to
make a much more convincing showing that the activity affects interstate
commerce.
18 7
Second, there are now Tenth Amendment limits on the Commerce Power
that prevent Congress from issuing certain direct orders to state officials. In
two recent decisions the Court has held that because of the Tenth Amendment,
Congress "may not compel the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program." The latest is United States v. Printz, s8 which struck down the Brady
Bill's requirement that sheriffs check the backgrounds of any gun purchasers
in their county. Earlier in New York v. United States,'89 the Court struck down
a federal law mandating that each state develop a plan for disposing of
radioactive waste generated within its borders or else "take title" to the waste.190
It might be argued that religious freedom legislation based on the Commerce
Power would violate the principle of New York and Printz by directly ordering
the states to pursue a certain policy toward religious exercise (that is, to leave
it alone in the absence of a compelling interest). And some of the language and
rationale of these decisions could support such an argument.
Although these two objections are theoretically different, they both end
up emphasizing the same claim: that inreligious liberty legislation Congress
is directly controlling the regulatory activity of the states, and the only source
of authority for Congress to do that is the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power (which is insufficient here under Boerne). Dan Conkle sums up his
concern with the Commerce Power rationale with a quote from the New York
decision: "The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause...
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not
187. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
188. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
189. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
190. These holdings do not apply to the Spending Power. The New York decision, for
example, upheld the part of the radioactive waste law that made funds available to the state if
it developed a waste disposal plan. See New York, 505 U.S. at 173. And Pintz likewise
distinguishes a direct order to state officials from a condition accompanying their receipt of
federal funds. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376. Again, Congress may condition funding on a
state agency's following a certain rule even if it may not directly require the agency to follow
the rule.
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authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate
commerce."191
However, the protection of religious freedom from state laws presents a
very different situation from the congressional mandates to state officials struck
down in Lopez, New York, and Printz. The key difference lies in the fact that
religious freedom legislation does not put an affirmative mandate to state and
local governments to carry out a federal program: rather, such legislation
simply displaces state and local laws to the extent necessary to protect the
activity of private religious individuals and organizations. As such, religious
freedom legislation is more analogous to legislation preempting state and local
laws, which of course is common under the Commerce Power. 92 Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in New York expressly distinguished the
power to preempt state law from the power to compel state officials to enact or
administer federal law, and it affirmed that Congress still has the power of
preemption. 193
Reading Lopez, New York, and Printz to forbid Congress from displacing
state laws would create serious difficulties with the doctrine of preemption.
Any preemption clause in a federal statute is a direct regulation of state and
local lawmaking. If Lopez is read to forbid or frown on such regulation
because state lawmaking is not an economic activity, this will cast all
preemption provisions into doubt. Likewise, if New York and Printz mean that
Congress cannot directly target state law in the form of displacing it, they will
cast doubt on the preemption power, for every preemption provision singles out
state laws for displacement.
It is true that in most preemption situations, such as ERISA for example,
Congress replaces the displaced state law with a scheme of federal regulation.
Justice O'Connor referred to this when she spoke of Congress "regulat[ing]
interstate commerce directly."' 94 But in some federal statutes, the regulatory
scheme that Congress imposes is one of deregulation: Congress sets minimal,
flexible standards of conduct for private activity and then, in order to preserve
the freedom sought by deregulation, forbids the application of state or local
laws to the deregulated conduct. The preemption provision is, of course,
crucial to the deregulatory goal, but it is not replaced with any extensive federal
regulation. Recent examples include the statutes deregulating airline rates 95
191. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
192. Thanks to Professor Chip Lupu for suggesting the relevance of preemption to this
question-although he should be (and I am certain would want to be) absolved of any
responsibility for the conclusions that I reach.
193. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
194. Id. at 166.
195. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 47 U.S.C. § 41701.
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and railroad and trucking industry operations. 19 A few terms ago, the Court
broadly interpreted the preemption provision in the Airline Deregulation Act
to forbid state attorneys general from bringing enforcement against airline rate
advertisements under general state laws forbidding false advertising. 97
Religious freedom legislation can be seen as kind of deregulatory statute
preempting state laws that impede on the freedom guaranteed to religiously
grounded conduct. At the very least, it is sufficiently analogous to the accepted
practice of preemption that any limits in Lopez, New York, and Printz should
not apply to it. Such legislation frees a zone of private conduct-from all laws,
federal and state, once one takes into account the original RFRA as applied to
federal law--and prohibits state law from interfering in that zone. The analogy
to preemption is close enough that the Court would be wise not to extend its
federalism decisions to congressional statutes, such as religious freedom
legislation, that simply displace state law.
It is important to realize that the basic thrust of religious freedom
legislation is simply to displace state law to the extent it burdens religion
without a compelling interest. The thrust is not to mandate any particular
affirmative program. The state is free to satisfy the legislation, to avoid
interference with religious exercise, in any one of a number of ways, no single
one of which is dictated by the statute. The state can repeal its general rule, can
exempt the religious believer or organization, or can adopt any other way of
regulating that does not impose a substantial burden on religious practice. For
example, when a public high school basketball league forbade an Orthodox
Jewish student to wear a yarmulke while playing because the cap might fall off
and cause other players to trip, the federal court suggested that a more secure
form of headgear might satisfy the state's safety concerns while allowing the
student to fulfill his religious duty of covering his head before God.' 98
196. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 40 U.S.C. § 10505, was intended to reduce regulation
of these industries. The Staggers Act provision allowing the Interstate Commerce Commission
to exempt carriers from certain regulation, 40 U.S.C. § 10505(a), has often been interpreted to
preempt state regulations. See G&T Terminal Packaging Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 830
F.2d 1230, 1233-36 (3d Cir. 1987); Alliance Shippers Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 858
F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
197. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (interpreting and
applying 41 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(l)).
198. See Menora v. Illinois High School Assn., 683 F.2d 1030, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 1982).
The case eventually settled with a similar compromise.
Religious freedom legislation is also different from the kind struck down in New York
and Printz because unlike the laws there, ir does not have as its "whole object.., to direct the
functioning of the state executive [or legislature]." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383. When a new
religious liberty statute covering state laws is considered together with other congressional
legislation, is clear that the states are not being singled out for federal regulation. The whole
range of federal laws is subject to the compelling interest test as well, under the original RFRA.
And in those few cases where private parties can burden religious practice in a context within
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I think that the arguments for upholding a carefully drafted Commerce
Power provision are substantially stronger than the arguments against it.
Nevertheless, the Commerce Power provision does present more difficulties
than the other possible components of new religious freedom legislation
regarding state laws. For one thing, it does go beyond both the Spending
Power and Section 5 components, by directly displacing state laws in a
situation where (according to Boerne) the Constitution does not require such
displacement. The Court has been increasingly protective in recent years of
states' authority. The justices would have to make a very large further step to
strike down a carefully drawn religious freedom law; but they might be willing
to do so, for we do not know how far their current commitment to federalism
will expand.
Perhaps more importantly, the Commerce Power rationale suffers from
moral and rhetorical disadvantages: it does not sound right to say that we
should keep religiously grounded conduct free in order to avoid contractions
or distortions of commercial activity. Indeed, resting religious accommoda-
tions on a commercial rationale puts them in the most unattractive light: it is
precisely when religions engage in commercial activity, in competition with
other entities, that opponents can argue that religious exemptions create unfair
favoritism and incentives for people to practice religion or to claim to be doing
so. I believe that the latter problem can be handled by a proper understanding
of the scope of exemptions; when the burden on a religious entity from a
generally applicable is nothing more than financial or administrative, with no
effect on doctrine or conscience, or the entity's ability to define its identity and
ministry, the burden is generally not "substantial."' 99 But there are also serious
claims of religious freedom that can be protected under the affecting-commerce
rationale. Finally, as with the situation of private racial discrimination, the
Court's narrow interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment (in both Smith
and Boerne) have left Congress with no choice but to turn to sources of power
such as the Commerce Clause.
The foregoing has acknowledged some uncertainties, both legal and
political, with a Commerce Power component of new religious liberty
legislation. Having acknowledged such problems, however, I want to suggest,
in the Conclusion, some reasons why Congress should seriously consider
congressional reach, Congress has acted to prevent such burdens. For example, it has
prohibited outright discrimination against religion in food and lodging services and in
employment. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 11, 42 U.S.C. §2000a(a); Title VI, §703(a),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). It has also required private employers to amend even their "generally
applicable" policies so as to make reasonable accommodations for their employees' religious
practices. See Title VII, § 703(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g).
199. See Berg, An Interpretive Guide, supra note 8, at 59-61.
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relying on every source of power that it has, even those that are marked by
some constitutional uncertainties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress should be able to protect religious exercise from generally
applicable laws even though the Constitution does not do so. Smith and
numerous other cases recognize the legitimacy of such permissive accommoda-
tions unless they go so far as to Violate the Establishment Clause. Moreover,
Congress should be able to give that protection generally, by applying a general
standard to a wide range of cases, rather than specifically through exemptions
enacted only for particular situations. There are powerful reasons for a general
standard of accommodation-above all, that it treats all religious claims
equally and avoids the favoritism that can easily creep into the process of
protecting religion case by case. Surely this argument is enough to support the
validity of RFRA as applied to federal law as an exercise of Congress's Article
I powers. It also provides a good reason for Congress to try again to legislate
so as to accommodate religion from state and local laws in a wide range of
circumstances.
A number of commentators are urging Congress, now that it has been
"burned by Boerne," to move very cautiously and not enact any religious
freedom statute, or any component of such a statute, that is not certain to be
upheld by the Court. They point out, rightly, that passing another law that is
invalidated five years down the road will do little for the cause of religious
liberty. They also suggest that including any constitutionally uncertain
component in new legislation will cause the Court to look askance at the entire
product.
The commentators are right that Congress should move carefully. At the
very least, Congress must include a clear provision that each component of new
legislation would be severable from the others if it were struck down.200 But
there are also good reasons to include as many components in new legislation
as have a reasonable chance of being upheld. Both the Spending and
Commerce power rationales alone cover only a portion of religious conflicts
with generally applicable laws. The benefits of fairness and neutrality provided
by general legislation decrease dramatically as Congress relies on fewer powers
and covers fewer claims. Moreover, strategically it may be wise to offer the
Court several different bases for acting, on the theory that it will not want to go
the whole route and strike all of them down.
200. See Conkle, supra note 13, at pt. II.
[Vol. 20
1998] FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 765
It is difficult to weigh such strategic considerations against the likelihood
that the Court will push further its protection of states' rights. It is difficult to
quantify each side of the ledger, let alone compare the two. But there are solid
arguments to support carefully drafted legislation under several remaining
congressional powers-and if the Court rejected these arguments, it would face
great difficulty in limiting the consequences of its position. Congress should
consider that fact; and it should also remember the moral and practical
advantages of general legislation that protects the exercise of all religious faiths
under the same standard.

